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SUMMARY
Closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs) that integrate the activities for reclaiming
residual values in postconsumer products with the traditional forward supply chain
activities are important from financial and environmental perspectives. This thesis
develops models and analyses on three topics novel to the field of CLSC research with
a goal of advancing knowledge about effective decision-makings in CLSCs.
In the first part of the thesis, we study joint control of stochastic forward and
stochastic reverse material flows in CLSCs. With an application to a CLSC where
postconsumer products are collected for warranty service purposes, we demonstrate
that the benefit of coordinating two production activities could be significant. We
develop a model that can be used to obtain an effective inventory control policy for co-
ordinating forward and reverse material flows. Through Monte Carlo simulation and
global sensitivity analysis, we identify major influential factors that affect system’s
warranty cost savings performance. The results indicate that joint control of forward
and reverse material flows greatly improves warranty cost savings performance as well
as system’s robustness to uncertainties.
The second part of the thesis develops a differential game model for characteriz-
ing decentralized time-varying competitive decision-making in a CLSC. The differen-
tial game model is particularly useful for studying time-varying interactive decision-
making in CLSCs that involve many stakeholders who pursue different objectives in
forward and reverse production activities. We identify optimal prices and production
strategies that evolve over time under fluctuating market demand. Also, the model
provides a quantitative scheme that can be used to obtain an efficient apportionment
of product recovery processes.
The third part of the thesis describes the relationship among consumers’ risk-
xii
aversion, product cannibalization of new products by remanufactured products, and
growth of CLSCs through price optimization models. Whereas price is one of the most
effective variables for managing market demand, previous CLSC research has mainly
focused on operational problems without paying much attention on the interface be-
tween CLSCs and markets. We develop models that jointly determine optimal prices
in forward and reverse channels considering consumers’ willingness-to-pay (WTP)
for remanufactured products, consumers’ willingness-to-accept (WTA) for a buyback
price, and consumers’ risk aversion to uncertain quality perceptions. The results show
that consumers’ active participation in CLSC is an important factor for the viabil-
ity and growth of a CLSC. Also, we show that companies can benefit from product




In 2008, 3.2 million tons of electronic waste was generated in the U.S., 86.4 percent
or 2.7 million tons of which was trashed in landfills or incinerators (Electronics Take-
Back Coalition). The potential value embedded in the waste steam is significant. The
amounts of gold and copper contained in one metric ton of electronic circuit boards
exceed 40 and 30 times the concentrations of gold and copper ores mined in the US,
respectively.1 While valuable in recovery, these materials pose serious environmental
and health risks when discarded in landfills. Electronic waste accounts for 75 percent
of harmful heavy metals found in landfills (Li et al., 2009).
1.1 Closed-Loop Supply Chains
Closed-Loop Supply Chains (CLSCs) that integrate the activities for reclaiming
residual values in postconsumer products with the traditional forward supply chain
activities are important from financial and environmental perspectives. CLSC can
help companies not only improve profit gains through efficient use of energy and
materials in their supply chains, but also resolve environmental and legal compliance
issues under rapidly increasing societal concern and regulatory pressure for “going
green.” However, unlike traditional forward supply chains, in which the major source
of uncertainty is fluctuating market demand, a much higher level of uncertainty is
generally associated with return flows of postconsumer products, complicating the




crucial to acquire the ability to make optimal decisions regarding design, operations,
and market adaptation considering the potential influence of uncertainty in the return
flows.
1.2 The Research Topics
This dissertation consists of three studies, each of which develops quantitative
models for the analysis of effective decision-making in CLSCs with an emphasis on
understanding the influence of uncertainty in the return flows of postconsumer prod-
ucts, time-varying market demand, and consumers’ risk preferences. In what follows,
we summarize the research topics.
Joint control of forward and reverse material flows. In Chapter II, we address
the problem of joint control of forward and reverse material flows in CLSCs as a way
of achieving cost savings and counteracting the impact of uncertainty in the return
flows of postconsumer products. Return flows of postconsumer products are generally
characterized by a high level of uncertainty in product quality and collection amount,
unlike the forward material flows that can be relatively well planned and controlled.
The uncertainty propagates through the system and eventually impacts the forward
material flows when return flows join the forward transaction channel after undergoing
a product recovery process. This interaction between forward and reverse material
flows complicates the decision-making, e.g., inventory planning, in CLSCs.
As an application, we consider a closed-loop warranty service model that processes
demands for new products and warranty claims with product take-back activities. We
frame this as a multiperiod random yield inventory control problem that extends the
open-loop warranty inventory model discussed in Huang et al. (2008). Whereas they
solve Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) to obtain optimal inventory policies for a
single inventory location that supports demand and warranty claims, the inclusion
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of stochastic return flows increases the model complexity in our case and makes
the MDP approach analytical and computationally intractable. We instead take a
simpler approach to work around this issue. That is, we approximate the multiperiod
problem with a single period problem. This approximation method has been shown
to produce high quality solutions (Bollapragada and Morton, 1999; Inderfurth and
Transchel , 2007). This method also gives exact solutions to the models discussed in
Huang et al. (2008).
We examine two closed-loop warranty service models, i.e., a coupled system (i.e.,
inventory for new products and inventory for recovered products are jointly controlled)
and a decoupled system (i.e., two distinct inventories are independently controlled),
and compare them to the open-loop warranty service model to quantify the benefit
of product recovery in cost savings. We conduct Monte Carlo simulation and global
sensitivity analysis to investigate the impact of uncertainty on system performance.
The results show that closed-loop warranty service models save warranty service costs
when the amount of uncertainty in the return flows is low, the unit cost savings
from product recovery is high, and a target warranty service level is not excessive.
Also, joint control of forward and reverse material flows significantly increases the
robustness of a CLSC to uncertainty in the return flows, making the system perform
always no worse than the open-loop system.
Differential game in CLSC. Chapter III examines the temporal aspect of op-
timal pricing and inventory decisions for decentralized CLSC decision makers who
engage in both forward and reverse production activities under a time-varying envi-
ronment. This work has recently been published (Lee et al., 2011). Rapid advances
in technology and decreasing product life cycles have resulted in massive generation
of waste steams that contain enormous residual value, which one can easily observe,
for example, in the consumer electronics industry. This is one clear example of how
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the benefit of CLSC can be maximized. Yet conflicting objectives of manufacturers
and collectors make it difficult to achieve a time-varying equilibrium in CLSCs when
market demand changes over time. The novelty of the proposed approach is that,
instead of assuming stationary exogenous and endogenous system conditions, as is
common in the literature, we employ differential dynamic game model to address the
influence of nonstationary market demand on time-varying key decisions in CLSC.
The objectives are (i) to determine decentralized pricing and production strategies,
in forward and reverse channels, which evolve over time, and (ii) to characterize the
influence of nonstationary market dynamics on the decision-making in CLSCs. From
the model we obtain useful insights on (i) the characteristics of optimal decentral-
ized dynamic pricing and production planning in forward and reverse channels, (ii)
the mathematical allocation mechanism for product recovery processes among agents,
and (iii) the benefit of a dynamic game model over static models for addressing de-
centralized decision-making in CLSCs.
Optimal prices, risk aversion, and product cannibalization. The third topic
is presented in Chapter IV, where we focus on interfacing operational problems with
marketing issues to obtain useful insights on optimal product prices, product cannibal-
ization, and the financial viability and growth of CLSCs. This research is motivated
by the fact that it is not just the price, but also the quality perception that consumers
take into account in their decisions for purchasing a product. We develop a model
that addresses consumers’ quality perceptions through a parameter that represents
the level of consumers’ risk aversion in their purchasing decisions. This is particularly
relevant for CLSCs where the quality of remanufactured products are perceived to
be inferior to that of new products. This often becomes a barrier for sustainable
growth of a recycling market. For instance, 40-50% of used car tires can be resold
through retreading at a price 30-40% cheaper than that of new tires (Environment
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Policy Committee, 2005). Consumers, however, are extremely risk averse to purchas-
ing retreaded passenger car tires, although it is guaranteed that there is no quality
difference between new and retreaded tires. Risk aversion can be bilateral. Consider
a remanufacturer who offers a buyback reward to customers who return their used
products. Postconsumer products are generally characterized by high levels of uncer-
tainty in residual values. In this case, establishing stable and financially viable return
flows will be impeded by firms’ lower willingness-to-pay for uncertain residual values
in used products and consumers’ lower willingness-to-accept for a buyback reward
for returning their used products. As such, understanding the characteristic distribu-
tions of WTP/WTA and the influence of uncertainty on risk averse decision-making
is fundamental for determining optimal prices and promoting the growth of CLSC
and the markets.
Whereas the assumption of uniformly distributed WTP has been widely used in
previous research, the validity of this assumption is questionable given that a real
WTP distribution is unlikely to follow a uniform distribution. The information on
WTP distribution is important for determining optimal prices. Thus, a solution ob-
tained from a uniformly approximated WTP distribution may directly impact compa-
nies’ profit performances in real markets. We show that the uniformWTP assumption
can produce a solution that is infeasible in a real market, or, if it is feasible, is of low
quality.
We relate consumers’ risk aversion to the problem of product cannibalization. The
‘fear of product cannibalization’ is widespread among many manufacturers. This is
a major barrier for the growth of product and material recycling. There is, how-
ever, no thorough scientific evidence for justifying the belief on the adverse effect of
product cannibalization. Through quantitative models, we examine the influence of
uncertainty and risk aversion of decision makers on product cannibalization, mar-
ket growth, and profit performance of a CLSC. We show that companies can pursue
5
profit increases by diversifying their product portfolio with new and remanufactured
products, although this may be accompanied by product cannibalization.
1.3 Contributions and Future Research Directions
CLSCs are complex systems that are significantly different from traditional for-
ward supply chains. The methodologies used for understanding the latter may not be
directly applicable to understanding effective design and operation of CLSCs. This
dissertation develops models and analysis on three topics novel to the field of CLSC
research. The approach in Chapter II is new in the sense that it combines a multi-
period stochastic inventory problem, a random yield problem, and a multiple inven-
tory transshipment problem within the context of CLSC in order to facilitate better
insights and new knowledge on effective product recovery operations with stochastic
return flows. The dynamic game model presented in Chapter III is the first one of its
kind for CLSC analysis. In particular, the model enables useful insights for designing
effective product recovery processes, the knowledge of which is not obtainable from a
static game model when we need to consider time-varying market demand. The price
optimization models in Chapter IV are significant as the first attempt in the CLSC
research field to quantify the effect of consumers’ risk aversion to remanufactured
products and its implication on the system performance and product cannibalization.
The models and results challenge the unjustified belief that product cannibalization
is bad and promote active engagement in product remanufacturing.
The three research topics discussed in this dissertation can be extended to explore
several interesting problems. These are discussed in Chapter V.
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CHAPTER II
Multiple Inventory Control in Closed-Loop Supply
Chains for Warranty Service
2.1 Introduction
Product warranty is critical for helping companies increase market share and cus-
tomer loyalty by guaranteeing product quality and promoting customer satisfaction.
Yet the benefit of warranty service comes with significant costs. In 2010, warranty
claims cost U.S.-based computer manufacturers about $5 billion.1 Computer man-
ufacturers try to save warranty costs, for instance, by shortening warranty period,
passing the burden of warranty service back to their suppliers, and reducing failure
rates in their products. Nevertheless, products fail. In 2010, product warranty liabil-
ity of Hewlett-Packard, the number one warranty service provider among computer
manufacturers in terms of warranty service cost, was $2.4 billion compared to an
operating profit of $11.5 billion (Hewlett-Packard Annual Report , 2010). Dell spent
more than $1 billion on warranty claims in 2010. Warranty claims rates are higher for
portable devices such as cell phones. Apple has seen steady rise in warranty claims
and it spent $250 million in the first quarter of 2011.
2.1.1 Closed-loop supply chain for warranty cost savings
In this chapter we investigate effective design and operation of CLSCs that utilize
postconsumer products as a way to save warranty costs. Manufacturers remanu-
1
All data and facts in this paragraph are from http://www.warrantyweek.com/archive/ww20110421.html
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facturer used products for warranty service purpose. For example, Hitachi Global
Storage Technologies, Inc. remanufactures defective hard drive returns for warranty
service (Khawam et al., 2007). This practice, however, is complicated by the exis-
tence of a high level of uncertainty in the return flows of postconsumer products. A
wide variety of quality differences exists in postconsumer products, which makes it
difficult for manufacturers to setup product recovery plan as the number of repairable
items may vary significantly from one period to another. The situation becomes even
more complicated when the uncertainty propagates through the system and eventu-
ally impacts the forward material flows. For instance, new items may have to be
used to meet warranty claims when there is a shortage in repairable items, but how
many will be needed depends on how many of collected postconsumer products and
returned defective items will be repairable. This is a critical problem in the operation
of CLSCs where the traditional forward supply chain activities need to be integrated
with the reverse production activities for better productivity and profitability. Most
manufacturers, however, separate the operations of the forward and reverse produc-
tion processes (Debo et al., 2005). A quantitative model that explains the interaction
between forward and reverse material flows is crucial for assisting optimal decisions,
e.g., an integrated inventory planning, in the CLSCs.
The importance of this research lies in the characterization of optimal inventory
policy that jointly controls the flows of new and postconsumer products for satisfying
demand and warranty claims in a cost effective manner. Our model reveals that joint
control of forward and reverse material flows greatly increases the system robustness
to the impact from uncertainties carried in by the return flows. For those companies
that operate independent forward and reverse production systems, we characterize,
through Monte Carlo simulation and global sensitivity analysis, conditions when their
warranty cost saving performance can be improved by transitioning to joint control
inventory policy.
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2.1.2 Modeling and solution approach
We develop closed-loop warranty service models that process demand and war-
ranty claims utilizing product take-back activities. We frame this as a multiperiod
random yield inventory control problem that is built on and extends the open-loop
warranty inventory model discussed in Huang et al. (2008). They address the problem
through Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) models and report that, in the case of a
manufacturer who uses new items to replace defective items, up to 69% of warranty
service costs could be saved by taking into account potential warranty claims in in-
ventory control. We show that CLSCs achieve further cost savings. As for modeling
and solution approach, the MDP is analytically and computationally intractable in
our case as the inclusion of stochastic return flows significantly increases the model
complexity. We instead take a simpler approach to work around this issue. That
is, we approximate the multiperiod problem with a single period problem. This ap-
proximation method has been shown to produce high quality solutions (Bollapragada
and Morton, 1999; Inderfurth and Transchel , 2007). This method also gives exact
solutions to the model discussed in Huang et al. (2008). We examine two closed-loop
warranty service models, i.e., a coupled system (i.e., inventory for new products and
inventory for recovered products are jointly controlled) and a decoupled system (i.e.,
two distinct inventories are independently controlled), and compare them to the open-
loop warranty service model to quantify the benefit of product recovery in warranty
cost savings. We conduct Monte Carlo simulation and global sensitivity analysis to
investigate the impact of uncertainty on system performance. The results show that
closed-loop warranty service models are effective for saving warranty service costs
given that the amount of uncertainty in the return flows is low, the unit cost savings
from product recovery is high, and a target warranty service level is not excessive.
Also, joint control of forward and reverse material flows significantly increases the
robustness of CLSC to uncertainty in the return flows, making the system perform
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always as well as or better than the open-loop system.
One of the major barriers to efficient warranty inventory management with prod-
uct recovery is uncertainty in the return flows of postconsumer products. This is
because inventory control must deal with a random supply of postconsumer products
as well as random demand from the market, which is different from the inventory
control of a traditional supply chain for forward material flows, where uncertainty is
usually assumed to exist only in future demands. A firm that engages in take-back
of postconsumer products generally faces a wide range of variability in the quality of
used products, which is unknown to the firm at the time of collection due to different
usage patterns of consumers.
Therefore, we are particularly interested in the influence of uncertainty in the
return flows on warranty service cost savings. It is known that lateral transshipment
between multiple inventory locations is effective for protecting systems from the im-
pact of uncertainty in demands. Motivated by this, we explore the potential benefit of
operating two parallel inventory locations for new and recovered products. Namely,
there are two distinct inventories: one for new products and the other for recovered
products. The first one, which we call the forward production system, will be mainly
influenced by the uncertainty in demand for new products, which is relatively well
understood by the research community. The latter, which we call the reverse pro-
duction system, will be directly influenced by the uncertainty in the return flows.
Additionally, the forward production system can supply the reverse production sys-
tem when the latter suffers from a shortage in recovered products. We assume that
the reverse production system cannot transship its recovered product to the forward
production system. This is because, in general, new products are made of new parts.
Such a structure is also in line with the recent trends, i.e., “firms are actively inte-
grating their after-sale parts and services with their forward supply chain processes”
(Huang et al., 2008). As such, our model generalizes the open-loop warranty ser-
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vice modes (Huang et al., 2008), random yield inventory model (Bollapragada and
Morton, 1999), and two-location transshipment model (Rudi et al., 2001) within the
context of a closed-loop supply chain.
To illustrate the potential benefit of joint control of forward and reverse material
flows, we investigate and compare three different cases: (i) an open-loop warranty ser-
vice system, (ii) a decoupled closed-loop warranty service system, and (iii) a coupled
closed-loop warranty service system. Case (i) is the one that is discussed in Huang
et al. (2008) and will be used as a reference case for examining the potential benefit
of our closed-loop warranty service models. In case (ii), the forward and reverse pro-
duction systems are independently operated. In case (iii), the forward and reverse
production systems are linked with lateral transshipment policy. Thus, the firm in
case (iii) has three options for processing warranty service requests: (i) use new items
to replace defective items, (ii) repair, if possible, failed items, or (iii) collect postcon-
sumer products from the market and recover them for providing warranty service.
The second and third options serve best for the purpose of saving warranty costs as
they are often significantly less costly than the first option when collection costs are
low enough to enable cost savings from unit product recovery.
In CLSC literature, product reclamation processes are classified as recycling, re-
manufacturing, refurbishment, and reuse depending on the level of dematerialization.
Since our model can address all these different cases, we use the term ‘recovery’ to
collectively indicate these different types of product reclamation processes.
2.1.3 Related literature
For a general introduction to issues in warranty service, we refer readers to Murthy
and Djamaludin (2002) and Murthy and Blischke (1992). Several other research ar-
eas are related to our study. The first one is a periodic review inventory system
with product recovery. Simpson (1978) derives a three-parameter optimal inventory
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policy, i.e., recover-up-to, order-up-to, and discard-down-to, for an inventory system
with stochastic demands and stochastic returns, where returns can be stored or dis-
carded before they are recovered. Inderfurth (1997) extend this result considering
the impact of lead time on the optimality of the inventory policy. van der Laan et al.
(1999) analyze “push” and “pull” remanufacturing policies in an inventory system
with product recovery. Fleischmann et al. (2002) extends a standard stochastic in-
ventory model by including stochastic returns. In their model, Poisson demands and
Poisson return flows are assumed to be independent of each other. There may ex-
ist correlations between demands and returns, but the benefits of the independence
assumption can outweigh the alternative of model complexity and the difficulty of ac-
curately capturing the correlation. A similar assumption is used by DeCroix (2006).
Kiesmüller and Minner (2003) discuss a joint inventory control problem for deter-
mining optimal produce-up-to and remanufacture-up-to levels through a newsvendor
type modeling approach. Two inventory locations, one for new and the other for
returned products, are considered, but recovered products finally join the inventory
for new products and there is no differentiation between new and recovered products.
As for multi-echelon systems, DeCroix et al. (2005) show the optimality of a sta-
tionary base-stock policy in a series inventory system where returns are modeled as
negative demands. DeCroix and Zipkin (2005) study the impact of product returns
on inventory management in an assembly system. DeCroix (2006) shows that when
return flows enter the upper most stage in a serial multi-echelon inventory system, an
optimal solution is obtained by solving a sequence of single-stage problems. This is
also the case for a serial system without returns discussed by Clark and Scarf (1960).
Common assumptions employed by the aforementioned papers are passive stochastic
returns, product recovery with no yield loss, stochastic demands, and perfect substi-
tution of recovered products for new products. The last assumption does not hold
in some practical cases, especially when consumers tend to differentiate between new
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and recovered products, e.g., new and used cellphones, new and retreaded tires, new
and used books, etc. In this case, one needs to model two distinct output streams, i.e.,
new and recovered from the system, which are supported by two separate inventories.
We contribute to this literature by expounding the control of multiple inventories for
processing multiple types of demands with product recovery.
In general, the yield from return flows and warranty returns is not perfect. This
aspect is addressed by Khawam (2009) who studies a single-location inventory con-
trol problem for warranty service. Warranty returns are repaired at a random yield
rate less than one; thus, new products are used to compensate for any shortage in
warranty inventory. In this chapter, we consider three different sources of supply to
the system: new materials, repaired warranty returns, and recovered postconsumer
products. Among these, the last two sources exhibit uncertainty which will be mod-
eled by random variables. This makes our model a multiperiod stochastic inventory
control problem with random yield. Whereas certain classes of multiperiod prob-
lems are known to have myopic solutions with efficient computational properties,
multiperiod inventory problems with unreliable supply do not generally have myopic
solutions (Arrow et al., 1958). Nevertheless, myopic solutions are known to provide
near optimal performance for a wide range of stochastic inventory control problems
(Bollapragada and Morton, 1999; Inderfurth and Transchel , 2007).
Unreliable supply introduces another difficulty in the inventory control problem,
e.g., balancing demand and supply. As is noted in their review of random yield
inventory problems, Yano and Lee (1995) point out that one of ways to mitigate
the impact of unreliable supply is to allow recourse actions. In practice, inventory
lateral transshipment among firms as a recourse action has proved to be effective for
increasing service level and reducing costs (Minner et al., 2003). Robinson (1990)
and Rudi et al. (2001) study single period transshipment problems. We combine the
transshipment problem and the random yield stochastic inventory control problem
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within a reverse supply chain context in order to investigate the benefit of the recourse
action in the presence of uncertain supply sources.
Lastly, there is a stream of research that directly mentions inventory management
for warranty service. Huang et al. (2008) show through a Markov Decision Processes
(MDP) modeling approach that a base stock policy is optimal for an open-loop supply
chain that processes customer demand and warranty service requests. They do not
consider product repair, but new products are used to meet both types of demands.
As opposed to the existing research in the field, our model differentiates new and
recovered products by implementing two distinct inventory locations, one for new and
the other for recovered products. These two inventories are linked by transshipment
policy from the forward production system to the reverse production system. Our
study extends the model for an open-loop supply chain for warranty service discussed
in Huang et al. (2008).
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 2.2 we briefly describe
the open-loop supply chain warranty service model with an alternative solution pro-
cedure to the MDP approach used in Huang et al. (2008). In section 2.3 we develop
the closed-loop supply chain warranty service model and its solution. In section 2.4
we discuss the characteristics of the solution to the closed-loop model. In the final
section, we summarize the results with concluding remarks.
2.2 Open-Loop Warranty Service Model
Huang et al. (2008) study an optimal inventory policy in an open-loop supply chain
that faces demands for new items and requests for warranty services as depicted in
Figure 2.1. Both types of demands are supported by one single inventory for new
products which are supplied by an external supplier. The authors obtain optimal
solutions to discounted finite horizon, discounted infinite horizon, and average cost






Figure 2.1: Base case: open-loop warranty service model. The problem is to deter-
mine the ordering quantity qn when the initial inventory is xn in order
to satisfy both of demands ζn and warranty service requests βwn at a
minimum cost.
alternative method that gives the same solutions. This method provides a simpler
solution procedure for more complex models that are discussed in §2.3.
First we briefly describe the open-loop warranty service model and the optimal
inventory policy within the context of a multiperiod newsvendor problem. Consider
a firm that faces random demand ζn and requests for warranty service βwn, where β
denotes the failure rate and wn is the total number of products being covered by the
warranty policy in period n. A detailed expression for wn is provided later in this
section. The product warranty is assumed to be renewable, i.e., once a product is
repaired through the warranty service, the warranty period for the product is renewed.
The firm’s problem is to determine the optimal order up to level yn or ordering
quantity qn in each period n, given an initial inventory level xn, i.e., yn = xn + qn.
The unit ordering cost is c. Any leftover item can be returned at the original purchase
price c, and any backlog at the end of each period can be fulfilled at the same purchase
cost c in the next period. The time value of money discount factor is denoted by α.
Depending on the actual demand realization, a unit holding cost h or shortage
penalty p is assessed. These are the two main trade-offs that drive the optimization
process in the model. When the system carries more inventory than is needed to
meet demands, the holding cost incurred at the end of period n is simply computed
by h(yn − βwn − ζn)+.
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The computation of inventory shortage cost is more involved than that of the
inventory holding cost because the product warranty policy applies to backlogged
demand with a time delay. More specifically, let po denote the unit shortage penalty
for the case when the firm sells products without warranty. Let us now examine
how the warranty policy alters po. The product warranty period comes in effect the
moment a customer begins using the product. This implies that the firm does not
have to consider any potential warranty claims for currently backlogged items because
these items are not in use by customers yet. The warranty period for backlogged items
begins only when the backlog orders are fulfilled, which happens in the following
period. In short, the warranty period for normal sales begins in the current period
but it is delayed by one period for backlogged items. Let cw denote the discounted
expected future warranty cost incurred by an item that is currently covered by the
warranty policy. Among those currently covered by warranty policy, a fraction β of
them is assumed to need warranty service in the current period. The cost of replacing
each failed item by a new unit is c, i.e., the unit ordering cost. Thus, the expected
cost of providing warranty service in the current period is cβ per item. In the next
period, the warranty policy remains effective with a rate δ and the warranty cost
is discounted by α. This gives αcβδ as the expected warranty cost in this period.
Similarly, we have α2cβδ2 as the expected warranty cost in the subsequent period.
We now obtain the following expression for cw




cβ + · · · = cβ
1− αδ . (2.1)
Therefore, the unit shortage penalty cost p has the following expression
p = po − cw + αcw. (2.2)
In other word, the unit shortage cost is adjusted by a one period discounted average
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warranty cost. Note that p < po and the difference between p and po comes from not
providing warranty service for backlogged items.
Let Cn(xn) be the minimum expected discounted cost over periods n, n+1, . . . , N
beginning with an inventory xn. We obtain the following recursion:
Cn(xn, wn) = min
yn≥xn
￿
c(yn − xn) + hE
￿




(βwn + ζn − yn)+
￿




xn+1 = yn − ζn − βwn (2.4)
wn+1 = δ
￿
(1− β)wn +min{yn, βwn + ζn}+ [xn]−
￿
. (2.5)
The right-hand-side of (2.5) consists of
• (1 − β)wn = the number of products that did not receive warranty service in
the previous period,
• min{yn, βwn + ζn} = the number of items delivered to the market, and
• [xn]− = the number of backlogged items.
The assumptions for the terminal values are costless return and backlogging with-
out penalty. Any product left over at the end of horizon can be returned at cost
and any backlog can be fulfilled at the original cost. This assumption facilitates a
stationary solution to the multiperiod model (Arthur F. Veinott , 1965). One such
example of the terminal value CN+1(xN+1) is given by
CN+1(xN+1) = −cxN+1 +
cβw
1− αδ (2.6)
where the first term accounts for the terminal inventory cost and the second term
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represents the expected discounted warranty cost for w items in the last period. Let
M(xn, wn) = Cn(xn, wn) + cxn. The recursion (2.3) becomes
Mn(xn, wn) = min
yn≥xn
￿
c(1− α)yn + hE
￿




(βwn + ζn − yn)+
￿
+ αE [Mn+1(xn+1, wn+1)]
￿
+ αc(µ+ βwn). (2.7)
Let us consider a myopic solution ym
n
to (2.7), i.e., a solution that minimizes
c(1− α)yn + hE
￿




(βwn + ζn − yn)+
￿
which is convex in yn.












for n = 1, 2, . . . , N . The assumption of a stochastically increasing sequence of random
variables ζn makes the myopic solution ymn an optimal solution to (2.7) (Gerchak and
Henig , 1989; Johnson and Thompson, 1975; Arthur F. Veinott , 1965). Huang et al.
(2008) use the same assumption, i.e., a stochastically increasing demand, to derive
the myopic solution (2.8) from their MDP approach. It can also be shown that for
the undiscounted infinite horizon problem, the optimal solution becomes
y






























Figure 2.2: Closed-loop warranty service systems. Each system consists of (1) forward
production system and (2) reverse production system.
2.3 Closed-Loop Warranty Service Systems
In this section we extend the open-loop warranty service model discussed in the
previous section to closed-loop warranty service models that incorporate product take-
back and repair processes for warranty service purposes. The goal is to satisfy demand
and warranty claims at a minimum cost. Each closed-loop model consists of a forward
production system and a reverse production system with an ordering quantity qn and
a collection quantity rn as decision variables, respectively (Figure 2.2). In the coupled
case, the forward production system supports the reverse production system in case a
shortage occurs at the latter. In the decoupled case, the two distinct inventories are
independently controlled without any inter-transshipment. Notations are explained
in Table 2.1. A solution to the decoupled case is easily obtained from the solution
for the coupled case. In what follows we construct the coupled CLSC model and
develop conditions that can be used to obtain a myopic solution to this random yield
transshipment multiperiod inventory problem.
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Table 2.1: Notation. (‘∗’ = random variables, ‘￿’ = decision variables)
Notation Meaning
c unit purchase cost
ϑ unit recovery cost
∆c warranty cost savings per unit product recovery, c− ϑ
kM unit shortage penalty for unmet demand
kR unit shortage penalty for unmet warranty service request
hM unit holding cost of new product
hR unit holding cost of recovered product
xn initial inventory of new products in period n
zn initial inventory of recovered products in period n
qn amount of new products ordered from the supplier
rn amount of used products collected from the market
en amount of new products used on warranty claims
wn amount of products under warranty
β warranty claims rate
δ warranty accrual rate
α time value of money discount factor
ζn ∗ demand for new product
ρ ∗ yield rate of collected products
η ∗ repair rate of returned products
ξn ∗ transformed random demand in reverse production system, (2.10b)
yn ￿ order-up-to level in forward production system, xn + qn
un ￿ collect-up-to level in reverse production system, (2.10a)
cv(X) coefficient of variation of X
µX mean of X
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2.3.1 Coupled closed-loop warranty service system
As described in the previous section, the firm faces two types of demands. The first
type is demand for new products and the second type is requests for warranty service.
Demand for new products, denoted by ζn in period n, is stochastic, independent and
identically distributed over time periods. A request for warranty service is generated
when a product fails. The product failure rate is β. With wn denoting the number of
products covered by warranty service in period n, the number of requests for warranty
service is βwn. Similar to Huang et al. (2008), we use a warranty accrual rate δ, or
a warranty expiration rate 1 − δ to model a limited warranty period. A fraction δ
of products remains to be covered by the warranty policy in the subsequent period.
Essentially, new products and recovered products are used for satisfying demand and
warranty service requests, respectively. However, if the amount of available recovered
units is not sufficient, new products may be used for warranty service, but recovered
products cannot be used for meeting demands for new products. This is why the
model has two distinct product inventories—one for new and the other for recovered
units. These two separate inventories are connected by the lateral transshipment
policy.
Whereas the inventory control at the forward production system is a typical pe-
riodic review inventory system where the distribution of demand is influenced by the
random inventory lateral transshipment, the inventory control at the reverse produc-
tion system is characterized by the existence of two random supplies. One stream
of random supply comes from the recovery of defective units. Not all defective units
are repairable, only a fraction η of them will be successfully repaired and used for
providing warranty service. This fraction is unknown until the actual repair process
completes. The other stream of random supply comes from the collection of postcon-
sumer products. The yield rate, denoted by ρ, from this stream of return flows is also
unknown until the actual product recovery process takes place.
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2.3.2 Representation of uncertainty in the return flows
Consider the inventory of the reverse production system. The manufacturer per-
forms product recovery over both collected items rn and returned items βwn, and
recovers only fractions ρ and η of them, respectively. The random yield rate η of
returned products will be assumed to be less than 1, which is the reason why the
manufacturer wishes to collect used products rn to fulfill warranty service requests.
Following the method used in Bollapragada and Morton (1999), we transform this
random supply problem with random demand into one that with random demand
and deterministic supply. Let us define order-up-to level un and random demand ξn
in the transformed model as follows:
un(rn) = zn + µρrn + µηβwn (2.10a)
ξn(rn) = βwn − (ρ− µρ)rn − (η − µη)βwn. (2.10b)
Given the available initial inventory zn and the number of products currently being
covered by warranty wn, the collection quantity rn determines the order-up-to level
for the reverse production system. The transformed demand ξn(rn) is a random
variable which depends on random yields ρ and η and the collection amount rn. The






Var[η] + 2rnβwnCov[ρ, η]. (2.11)
Note that the collection amount rn depends on the initial inventory zn which differs
from one period to another. This makes the distribution of demand ξn(rn) nonsta-
tionary.
Definition II.1. We define the coefficient of variation of the transformed demand












2.3.3 Inventory lateral transshipment
If the amount of recovered product is not sufficient after all uncertainties are
revealed, then a transfer en from the inventory for new products is initiated as needed.
We consider the case where warranty claims preempt demands for customer loyalty
issues. We also consider a time period that is longer than any potential shipment
delay along the transshipment line. This enables us to assume zero shipment delay
and to avoid increasing the complexity of model. For practical implementation of
the lateral transshipment policy, physical shipment from the forward to the reverse
production system is not necessary, as any new replacement item can be directly
shipped to the customer from the forward production system. The expression for the
recourse action en is then given by
en(yn, rn) = min{(ξn(rn)− un(rn))+, yn}
= min{(βwn − ηβwn − zn − ρrn)+, yn}. (2.13)
In case of shortage in the available recovered products, i.e., ξn(rn) > un(rn), the
amount of new products needed to be shipped to the reverse production system is
ξn(rn)− un(rn), but this amount will be limited by the availability yn at the forward
production system.
The inventory balance at each location is given as follows:
xn+1 = yn − en(yn, rn)− ζn (2.14)
zn+1 = un(rn) + en(yn, rn)− ξn(rn) (2.15)
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For simplicity we will suppress the dependency of un(rn), ξn(rn), and en(yn, rn) and
use un, ξn, and en unless they are needed for clarity. Assuming renewable warranty,
we have an expression for the number of products that are covered by warranty in
the (n+ 1)st period:
wn+1 = δ
￿
(1− β)wn +min{yn + un, yn − en + ξn, ζn + ξn}+ x−n + z−n − rn
￿
(2.16)
The first term, (1− β)wn, of the right hand side of (2.16) is the number of products
that did not request warranty service in period n. The second term represents the
system outputs in period n, i.e., the amount sold and serviced, which is determined
by the available inventory and demands. Four possible cases are considered as follows.
• When both locations suffer from shortage, the system has to use all units that
are available, i.e., yn + un.
• Any shortage at the second location implies the shortage at the first location
as well. Hence, this is equivalent to the previous case.
• When only the first location suffers from shortage, output flow from the system
is yn − en + ξn.
• When there is no shortage at both locations, all demands and requests for
warranty service, i.e., ζn + ξn, are satisfied.
We consider full backlogging. Any unmet demand or unmet request for warranty




. Finally, the warranty policy
expires for collected postconsumer products, rn.
2.3.4 The costs
Ordering cost is c per unit and product recovery cost is ϑ per unit for both of
failed returns and collected postconsumer products. We assume c−ϑ > 0; otherwise,
product recovery will not be profitable for providing warranty service. A request for
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warranty service is processed by a recovered product when ξn − un < 0, or by a new
product when ξn − un ≥ 0. Thus, the average cost, denoted by sn, for processing a
request for warranty service is computed by
sn = ϑPr (ξn − un < 0) + cPr (ξn − un ≥ 0) (2.17)
= ϑ+ (c− ϑ)Pr (ξn − un ≥ 0) .
Note that sn is a function of rn, that is, the collecting effort influences the average
unit warranty service cost. The warranty policy begins in the next period for any
unmet demand or warranty service request. This implies that there are savings from
not applying the warranty policy to unmet demand and warranty service requests in
the current period. Thus, the unit shortage penalty needs to be adjusted as follows.
ki,n = ki −
βδsn





1− αβ for i = M,R.
The shortage penalty costs kM,n and kR,n are dependent on collection amount rn
and this makes the analysis complicated. However, the solution procedure is greatly
simplified if we consider the undiscounted case, i.e., α = 1, in which kM,n and kR,n
become constants kM and kR, respectively.
The single period overage and shortage costs at the forward production system
are given by
CM,n(yn, rn) = hME[(yn − en − ζn)+] + kME[(ζn + en − yn)+] (2.19)
and at the reverse production system
CR,n(yn, rn) = hRE[(un + en − ξn)+] + kRE[(ξn − en − un)+]. (2.20)
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Define
Cn(yn, rn) = CM,n(yn, rn) + CR,n(yn, rn). (2.21)
Let gn(xn, zn, wn) be the minimum expected cost over periods n, n+ 1, . . . , N begin-
ning with initial states xn, zn, and wn. We obtain the following recursion:
gn(xn, zn, wn) +Gn(xn, zn, wn) = min
yn≥xn, rn≥0
￿
c(yn − xn) + ϑ(un(rn)− zn)
+ Cn(yn, rn)
+ E [gn+1(xn+1, zn+1, wn+1)]
￿
(2.22)
where Gn is the expected cost in period n (Bollapragada and Morton, 1999).
Define M(xn, zn, wn) = gn(xn, zn, wn) + cxn + ϑzn and ∆c = c − ϑ. Rewrite the
recursion (2.22) as
M(xn, zn, wn) +Gn(xn, zn, wn) = min
yn≥xn, rn≥0
￿
∆cE[e(yn, rn)] + Cn(yn, rn)
+E [Mn+1(xn+1, zn+1, wn+1)]
￿
+ cµζ + ϑµξ. (2.23)





) to (2.23), i.e., a solution
that minimizes the single period cost, denoted by Ln(yn, rn),
Ln(yn, rn) = cµζ + ϑµξ +∆cE[e(yn, rn)] + Cn(yn, rn)
= cµζ + ϑµξ +∆cE[e]
+ hME[(yn − en − ζn)+] + kME[(ζn + en − yn)+]
+ hRE[(un + en − ξn)+] + kRE[(ξn − en − un)+]. (2.24)
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Proposition II.1. The optimal solution (y∗, r∗) that minimizes (2.24) is obtained by
simultaneously solving the following two equations




kR −∆c − kM
hM + kM
Pr (y < γ) + Pr (y − γ < ζ < y) (2.25)
and
E[ρ











￿￿ 0 < γ < y − ζ
￿















Proof. See the appendix of this chapter for details of the proof.
Definition II.2. The service level at the forward production system is defined as
kM/(kM+hM). The warranty service level at the reverse production system is defined
as kR/(kR + hR).
In traditional newsvendor problems, the critical ratio k/(k + h), or the service
level, determines the optimal order quantity that satisfies all demands with a proba-
bility k/(k+h). In our model, two critical ratios kM/(kM +hM) and kR/(kR+hR) are
embedded in (2.25) and (2.26), but the usual meaning of the critical ratio does not
apply in this case due to the complex interaction of the forward and the reverse mate-
rial flows.2 Nevertheless, the equations (2.25) and (2.26) are generalized newsvendor
solutions, where kM/(kM + hM) and kR/(kR + hR) play key roles for determining
2
For example, a typical newsvendor solution has a form Prob(D < Q) = k/(k + h), which can
be interpreted as “an order quantity Q satisfies demand quantity D with a probability k/(k + h)”
or “100k/(k + h)% of demand quantity D is satisfied with an order quantity Q.” In (2.25) and
(2.26), the relationship between an order quantity and a critical ratio does not have such a simple
representation.
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optimal order and collection quantities, respectively.
2.4 Global Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we address the following two main questions: (1) How much war-
ranty service costs can be saved in the closed-loop warranty service systems? and
(2) What is the influence of uncertainties on the systems? In the first question, we
are interested in the amount of savings in warranty service costs. Closed-loop sys-
tems utilize recovered postconsumer products which are cheaper than new products.
Thus, one might conclude that both of the two closed-loop systems would lead to
cost savings. However, the impact of uncertainty in the return flows, especially the
uncertainty in the yield rate from collected material, could have an adverse effect
on warranty service cost savings. This will be addressed by the second question.
Our approach is a large-scale numerical experimentation that employs Monte Carlo
simulation and global sensitivity analysis.
2.4.1 Performance measure
We need to define a measure by which the performances of closed-loop systems
can be evaluated. To compute the cost that is contributed by providing warranty
service, let us consider a pure forward production system, e.g., the forward production
system in the decoupled CLSC model, which is a typical newsvendor system. Let J ￿
O
denote the total cost of this system. Next, let JO denote cost of the open-loop
warranty service system (Figure 2.1). The difference between JO and J ￿O represents
the cost due to warranty service. We assume that JO > J ￿O as providing warranty
service will only increase the total cost. Let WO = JO − J ￿O denote the cost of
providing warranty service in the open-loop system. Similarly, let Jcoupled and Jdecoupled
denote the total cost of the coupled system (Figure 2.2(a)) and decoupled system
(Figure 2.2(b)), respectively. Then the costs due to warranty service are expressed
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by Wcoupled = Jcoupled − J ￿O and Wdecoupled = Jdecoupled − J ￿O for coupled and decoupled
closed-loop models, respectively. We can now compare the relative performance,
denoted by Y , of two closed-loop systems to the open-loop system by the following
simple expressions:
Ycoupled = 100× (Wcoupled −WO)/WO (2.27a)
Ydecoupled = 100× (Wdecoupled −WO)/WO. (2.27b)
The cost of the open-loop system is used as a reference value to which the costs of
the other two closed-loop systems are compared. For example, a negative value for
Y implies warranty service cost savings in the CLSC model, which is desirable.
2.4.2 Factors
We choose nine factors from the cost function (2.24) as potentially influential fac-
tors and investigate their influence on system performance. The parameter values are
adopted from industry practices and related literature in warranty service problems
as shown in Table 2.2. We consider the range [0.02, 0.10] as the rate of warranty
returns. Warranty claims rates generally do not exceed 5% in consumer electronic
and automotive industries.3 In some cases, product failure rate goes beyond 10%,
e.g., Microsoft Xbox 360.4
Huang et al. (2008) identify that the unit holding cost hM is not a significant
components of the total costs. We normalize each of cost coefficients c, ϑ, kM , hR,
and kR in (2.24) with hM , or equivalently, hM = 1. While this does not change
the solution, we can reduce the number of factors in the sensitivity analysis. A
remanufactured product is obtained at a cheaper cost, ϑ, than c for a new product.






product as hR = (ϑ/c)hM = (1 − ∆c/c)hM . For a given value of a holding cost
hM or hR, we choose to specify a service level kM/(kM + hM) or kR/(kR + hR),
rather than a shortage penalty cost kM or kR, which is generally more informative
for inventory decision-making in a newsvendor approach than individual values for
holding/shortage costs. Another reason for this approach is that a dimensionless
factor is desirable for generalizing the interpretation of subsequent sensitivity analysis.
We set the value of unit ordering cost c between 8 and 20. Huang et al. (2008) consider
a range [0.01, 0.3] for a value of the holding cost hM when c = 2. With hM = 1, this is
equivalent to taking a value of c from [7, 200]. We reduce this range to [7, 20] because
too much variations in the unit ordering cost c can dominate the influence of other
factors in the output variation. It is known that remanufacturing can save up to 70%
in the case of printer cartridges.5 Thus, we consider [0.1, 0.7] for the values of ∆c/c.
This range can explain cost savings from remanufacturing for many other products
such as vehicle engines6 and power tools7, to name a few. The values of service levels,
coefficients of variation, and mean repair rates are adopted from the case study of
the warranty service inventory problem for Hitachi GST addressed in Khawam et al.
(2007).
Demand sample data are drawn from a normal distribution N(1000, σ2
ζ
). A dif-
ferent choice of a mean demand level does not distort the numerical analysis. We
only need a sufficiently large number to avoid the generation of negative numbers.
The random yield ρ of collected products and the random repair rate η of warranty
returns are drawn from truncated normal distributions with a common support [0, 1].
Without loss of generality, the mean value of random yield ρ is set to 1. This is
because any change in the mean value of ρ will be scaled by the decision variable r,









Table 2.2: Parameter values for the numerical experiments. Nine factors are exam-
ined in global sensitivity analysis. (Numerical values are adopted from the
referred sources with slight modifications.)
Factors Min Max Reference
warranty claims rate, β 0.2 0.1 www.warrantyweek.com
unit ordering cost (c) 7 20 Huang et al. (2008)
fractional cost savings per unit
product recovery, ∆c/c
0.1 0.7 typical unit cost savings from
remanufacturing, e.g., printer
cartridges
service level at reverse produc-
tion system, kR/(kR + hR)
0.70 0.99 Khawam et al. (2007)
service level at forward pro-
duction system, kM/(kM+hM)
0.70 0.99 Khawam et al. (2007)
cv of demand, cv(ζ) 0.1 0.9 Khawam et al. (2007)
cv of repair rate of warranty re-
turns, cv(η)
0.1 0.9 Khawam et al. (2007)
cv of yield rate of return flows,
cv(ρ)
0.1 0.9 Khawam et al. (2007)
mean repair rate of warranty
returns, µη
0.2 0.7 Khawam et al. (2007)
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only through the term ρr. The same assumption is used in Bollapragada and Morton
(1999).
2.4.3 Sensitivity indices
To identify influential factors, we use Monte Carlo simulation, i.e., we randomly
sample the value of each of nine factors from the predefined range, as shown in
Table 2.2, and analyze the output variance of Y . In other word, the performance
measure Y is regarded as a stochastic process whose variance is determined by the
collective variations of nine factors. This method is called global sensitivity analysis
(Sobol , 2001; Saltelli et al., 2008). More specifically, we compute the following two
sensitivity measures,
Si =








The first measure (2.28) is called the first-order sensitivity index of a factor Xi on
the output Y . The notation X∼i means that the expectation is taken over all factors
except Xi. The expected value EX∼i [Y |Xi] represents the level of output Y when the
value of a given factor Xi is fixed at a specific value. The expectation is taken over
all possible values of the factor Xi. We then compute the variance of these expected
value, i.e., VXi [EX∼i [Y |Xi]]. Therefore, Si represents the fractional portion of output
variance of Y , which is due to the factor Xi. A higher value of Si implies that Xi has
a more influential impact on Y . It also follows that the value of Si is always between




The second measure (2.29) is called the total effect. This index accounts for all higher
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order interactions of Xi with other factors including the first-order effect. The two
measures, Si and STi , are referred to as Sobol indices. Saltelli et al. (2008) show that
the first-order index is related to the standardized coefficient of a linear regression
model, but the former is applicable to more general cases such as a nonlinear model
while the latter is appropriate for a sensitivity analysis of linear models. Both of
the methods ignore each factor’s scale of units. The system output Y , as defined in
(2.27), is an outcome of highly nonlinear interactions among the system parameters.
Thus, (2.28) and (2.29) best serve for the sensitivity analysis of our model.
In order to compute the Sobol indices, we need to populate random samples that
will be used for computing system output Y . Using the method proposed in Saltelli
(2002), we generate two sets of 20,000 random samples from the ranges defined in
Table 2.2 to estimate the Sobol indices. The estimated first-order and total effects
are shown in Figure 2.3.
2.4.4 Influential factors
Let us first consider the sensitivity indices for coupled closed-loop system (Figure
2.3(a)). One can easily observe that the output variance Ycoupled is mostly dominated
by ∆c/c. The unit cost savings per remanufacturing, ∆c/c, is the most influential
factor with a first-order index 0.61. This is an intuitive result because a higher ∆c/c
will result in higher cost savings, i.e., a decrease in the value of Ycoupled. The next most
influential factor is the unit ordering cost c with a first-order index 0.24. The coupled
closed-loop system receives transshipment from the forward production system. Thus,
an increase in c will lead to a decrease in warranty cost savings. This will be verified
in the next subsection. The variation in the mean repair rate appears to be the third
most influential factor, but the fractional portion in the output variance is negligible.
This implies that the contribution to the output variance from uncertainty in the
return flows or in demand is virtually non-existent in the coupled closed-loop system.
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warranty claims rate, β
cost savings from unit product recovery, ∆c/c
critical ratio at reverse production system, kR/(kR + hR)
critical ratio at forward production system, kM/(kM + hM )
unit ordering cost, c
cv of demand, σζ/µζ
cv of repair rate of warranty returns, ση/µη
mean repair rate of warranty returns, µη
cv of yield rate of return flows, σρ/µρ












(a) Sobol indices: dependent variable = Ycoupled
warranty claims rate, β
cost savings from unit product recovery, ∆c/c
critical ratio at reverse production system, kR/(kR + hR)
critical ratio at forward production system, kM/(kM + hM )
unit ordering cost, c
cv of demand, σζ/µζ
cv of repair rate of warranty returns, ση/µη
mean repair rate of warranty returns, µη
cv of yield rate of return flows, σρ/µρ












(b) Sobol indices: dependent variable = Ydecoupled
Figure 2.3: Estimated Sobol sensitivity indices.
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The number of influential factors increases in the decoupled closed-loop system
(Figure 2.3(b)) because the impact of the uncertainty in the return flow on the reverse
production system is not buffered by the inventory transshipment from the forward
production system. The most influential factor for this case is the critical ratio,
kR/(kR+hR), at the reverse production system, which determines the warranty service
level. This result is similar to that of Khawam et al. (2007) who study a single-
location inventory problem that is dedicated to warranty returns. In their model, the
firm initially replenishes the inventory with new products. For each of the warranty
returns, a replacement item (new or remanufactured) or a monetary credit is offered.
Their result shows that the system performance is significantly influenced by the
service level. This is consistent with our sensitivity analysis, which indicates that the
service level is the most influential factor.
In terms of first-order effect, the next most influential factor is the cost savings
per unit product recovery, ∆c/c, which is understandable for the same reason as
discussed in the case of the coupled closed-loop system. However, if we look at the
total effect index, the second most influential factor is the variation in the yield
rate from collected postconsumer products, σρ/µρ. This implies that the uncertainty
in the return flows of postconsumer products can significantly disrupt the system
performance through interacting with other factors, unlike the case of coupled system.
This is because the impact from the uncertainty in the return flow is not buffered
by the forward production system through the inventory transshipment. The impact
from the variation in the repair rate of defective items, ση/µη, on the output variance
is also substantial.
Overall, we can conclude that the decoupled closed-loop system is highly influ-
enced by the warranty service level and uncertainty in the return flows. This result
clearly demonstrates the benefit of jointly controlling the two separate inventories
with a lateral transshipment policy. By linking the reverse production system to the
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Figure 2.4: Sensitivity of warranty costWO to system parameters (open-loop system).
forward production system, the system greatly enhances its robustness to the impact
from the uncertainty in the return flows. In the coupled closed-loop system, not only
the influences of uncertainties in return flows, but also that of demand, are non-
influential. This is a well-known property of the robustness of a newsvendor solution
to demand uncertainty.
Further, the influence of the warranty service level becomes virtually non-existence
in the coupled closed-loop system, which is important because many firms pursue a
high level of warranty service for maintaining customer loyalty and brand image. The
first-order effect of c is zero in the decoupled system because there is no transshipment
from the forward production system.
We have thus far examined the sensitivity of the relative performance of two
CLSCs with respect to the open-loop system. This implies that a parameter, say
x, that appears to be non-influential could be influential if the open-loop system is
sensitive to x. In order to verify this, we show the sensitivity of warranty cost WO
in the open-loop system to various factors in Figure 2.4. There exist two influential
factors, the warranty claims rate, β, and the unit ordering cost, c, in the open-loop
system. The relative warranty cost savings performances of the CLSCs are insensitive
to β because the unit cost savings∆c from remanufacturing is independent of the level
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of β, but the actual warranty cost of the open-loop system is highly sensitive to β.
Therefore, β is an influential factor for the actual warranty costs of the CLSCs. On
the other hand, the unit ordering cost, c, is influential in the open-loop system as
well as in the CLSCs.
While the Sobol indices give information for ranking factors in terms of relative
influential impact on the output variable Y , these are not informative for examining
the actual change in the performance measure, i.e., increase or decrease in Y . The
latter is discussed through scatter plots in the next subsection.
2.4.5 Warranty cost savings performances in the CLSCs
Figure 2.5 shows the scatter plots of the six most influential factors that are
identified from the Sobol indices in Figure 2.3. The vertical axis of each scatter plot
represents the system warranty cost savings performance values, Ycoupled for “￿” and
Ydecoupled for “￿.” To better understand the change in the distribution of Y , we fit
a locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (LOWESS) line for each case of decoupled
and coupled CLSCs. For the coupled CLSC, the LOWESS lines are almost flat except
for the two factors, c (Figure 2.5(e)) and ∆c/c (Figure 2.5(f)), as they are the two
most influential factors for Ycoupled. Figure 2.5(e) shows that an increase in c results
in an increase in Ycoupled, which means less warranty cost savings. This verifies our
reasoning for the influence of c on Ycoupled discussed in the previous subsection. In
Figure 2.5(f), we can verify that more warranty cost savings are possible with a higher
∆c/c.
As opposed to the coupled CLSC, the decoupled CLSC shows much higher varia-
tions in the system performance Ydecoupled. This shows that the warranty cost savings
in the decoupled CLSC is sensitive to internal and external ‘disturbances’ such as the
uncertainty in the return flows (as represented by σρ/µρ), the uncertainty in warranty
returns (as represented by ση/µη), and the warranty service level, kR/(kR + hR). In
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(a) cv of yield rate of return flows, σρ/µρ (b) mean repair rate of warranty returns, µη
(c) cv of repair rate, ση/µη (d) critical ratio, kR/(kR + hR)


































Figure 2.5: Scatter plots of six influential factors on warranty cost savings, Y . In
each plot, the symbols “￿” and “￿” indicate Ycoupled and Ydecoupled, re-
spectively. A negative value of Y indicates a cost saving.
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particular, Figure 2.5(d) shows that the system performance rapidly deteriorates as
the warranty service level increases in the range [0.8, 0.99]. This confirms the results
in Khawam et al. (2007). The nonlinearity of warranty cost savings in the decoupled
CLSC observed in Figure 2.5(d) is related to the nonlinear relationship between the
warranty service level kR/(kR + hR) and the unit shortage penalty kR. As the war-
ranty service level approaches 1, the shortage penalty cost approaches infinity at an
increasing rate.
We can use the LOWESS lines to answer our first question, i.e., how much war-
ranty cost savings would be possible with CLSCs? The coupled CLSC is almost free
from the influence of uncertainty. The system has two major influential factors, c
and ∆c/c, but these are non-stochastic quantities. Thus, decision makers can use
the LOWESS lines to estimate potential warranty cost savings in the coupled CLSC
without concerning much about the level of uncertainty in the return flows.
For the decoupled CLSC, we can still use the scatter plots and LOWESS lines to
estimate the cost savings. However, in this case, the influence from the uncertainty
in the return flows and warranty returns is significant. Let us consider two factors,
the cost savings per unit product recovery, ∆c/c, and the critical ratio, kR/(kR+hR).
These are the two most influential factors in the reverse production system, which can
be “managed” unlike the uncertainty in return flow. Let us assume that these two
factors are given as fixed parameters whose values are determined by the firm’s unique
characteristics of the production systems and warranty service policy. This is to focus
on understanding the influence of uncertainty in return flow, i.e., the variations in
yield rate of return flows, σρ/µρ, and repair rate of warranty returns, ση/µη, on the
system performance. Rather than separately investigating the influence of each of
the two uncertain quantities, we are interested in the influence of the total amount
of uncertainty in the return flows. To this end, we use the coefficient of variation of
the transformed demand, defined in (2.12), to plot Figure 2.6 that can be used to tell
39
where the firm is located under a given circumstance.
The horizontal and vertical axes of Figure 2.6 represent two ‘deterministic’ quan-
tities that are determined by firm’s unique characteristics. Depending on the amount
of uncertainty in the return flows, the firm will experience an increase or a decrease
in warranty service costs. The intensity of darkness indicate the absolute value of
Ydecoupled. To better illustrate whether it is a decrease or an increase in cost, we use
two symbols—“￿” for cost decrease and “￿” for cost increase. One can observe
that the plot contains two regions—one with shapes “￿”, i.e., the cost saving region,
and the other with shapes “￿,” i.e., the cost increase region. Cost savings are more
likely with a higher cost savings per unit product recovery, ∆c/c, and a lower critical
ratio, kR/(kR+hR). A high value of ∆c/c would be possible, e.g., with the support of
well-designed product recovery processes. But a low warranty service level is unlikely
in practical cases. Yet the upper right region of Figure 2.6 shows that cost savings
are still possible if the level of uncertainty is low, i.e., one can observe a small “￿”
symbol at the coordinate (0.45, 0.97), which are surrounded by large “￿” symbols.
One good example for this case is the laser toner cartridge, which is known to save











































Relative warranty cost savings in the decoupled CLSC
with respect to OLSC, Ydecoupled = 100× (Wdecoupled −WO)/WO
Figure 2.6: Warranty cost savings in the decoupled CLSC (200 example cases). This
is a plot of the absolute values of Ydecoupled as defined in (2.27b). For
a given combination of warranty service level and cost savings from unit
product recovery, the warranty cost savings largely depend on the amount
of uncertainty in return flows. As warranty service level approaches 1, the
warranty service costs in the decoupled CLSC becomes higher (i.e., darker
triangles) than that in the open-loop system.
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2.4.6 Benefits of the coupled CLSC
The result from the previous section implies that if a firm wishes to achieve a high
warranty service level, it is desirable to jointly control the forward and the reverse
material flows in its system because the coupled CLSC always performs better than
the open-loop system, even when the warranty service level is close to 1 (Figure
2.5(d)). If the return flows do not save on the warranty cost, the optimization process
will shut down the return flows. Thus, the warranty service cost in the coupled CLSC
cannot be higher than that in the open-loop system. This is illustrated in Figure
2.7, where there are only one kind of shapes “￿”, unlike the case of the decoupled
CLSC. The benefits of the coupled CLSC over the decoupled CLSC and the open-loop
system are summarized as follows:
• The coupled CLSC always performs better than the open-loop system.
• The coupled CLSC is robust to the impact from the uncertainty in the return
flows.
• The coupled CLSC’s warranty service cost savings performance is insensitive to
the warranty service level.
Figure 2.8 shows that the average improvement in the warranty cost savings in the
coupled CLSC over the open-loop system is almost linear to the fractional unit cost















































Relative warranty cost savings in the coupled CLSC
with respect to OLSC, Ycoupled = 100× (Wcoupled −WO)/WO
Figure 2.7: Warranty cost savings in the coupled CLSC (200 example cases). This is a
plot of the absolute values of Ycoupled as defined in (2.27a). The decoupled
CLSC always performs better than the open-loop system. The cost sav-
ings per unit product recovery is the major influential factor that affects
the warranty cost savings in the coupled CLSC. The system performance












Figure 2.8: Benefit of using return flows for saving warranty costs in the coupled
CLSC.
2.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we address the problem of saving warranty costs through CLSCs
that collect and recover postconsumer products for processing warranty claims. In
the CLSCs, new products, recovered postconsumer products, and repaired defective
warranty returns are available for providing warranty services. The latter two options
are generally less costly than using new products, but the overall warranty cost savings
depend on how much uncertainties are embedded in the return flows and how high
the firm sets the target warranty service level. We investigate two cases: coupled
CLSC and decoupled CLSC. In the coupled CLSC case, forward and reverse material
flows are optimally coordinated through lateral inventory transshipment from the
forward production system to the reverse production system. This work develops a
new model for CLSCs that integrate a random yield supply problem, an inventory
transshipment problem, and a multiple-inventory control problem to address joint
control of the forward and reverse material flows. We solve the models using a single
period approximation and obtain myopic solutions. This approach is known to provide
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a high quality solution. In the case of deterministic supply, the approach can produce
an exact solution with suitable assumptions.
We show that the coupled CLSC always achieves warranty cost savings while
greatly enhancing the system robustness to the impact from the uncertainty in the
return flows. The decoupled CLSC, where forward and reverse material flows are
separately controlled, does not necessarily save warranty costs. When the amount of
uncertainty in return flows and target warranty service level are high, the decoupled
CLSC may perform worse than the open-loop system, i.e., the system where only new
products are used to provide warranty services. We identify conditions on influential
system parameters under which the decoupled CLSC performs better or worse than
the open-loop system.
On the contrary, the coupled CLSC performs always as well as or better than
the open-loop system. The system is insensitive to the impact from the uncertainty.
There is little change in the warranty service cost in the coupled system when the
warranty service level increases. The result implies that by using a uniform WTP
approximation in these situations, companies that operate independent forward and
reverse production systems can achieve warranty cost savings and enhance the system
robustness to uncertainty by coordinating the separate material flows.
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2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Proof of Proposition II.1
For notational simplicity, we drop the time subscript n. The convexity of (2.24)
follows from Robinson (1990), Rudi et al. (2001), and Huh and Nagarajan (2010)
and we find the values of y and r that simultaneously satisfy ∂L(y, r)/∂y = 0 and
∂L(y, r)/∂r = 0. The following lemma will be used to derive the first order partial
derivative for each term of L(y, r).
Lemma II.1. For an affine function g(Q), Q > 0, with independent random coef-








￿￿ g(Q) > 0
￿





￿￿ g(Q) > 0
￿
P (g(Q) > 0) .
(2.30)
Proof. The expected value of the nonnegative random variable max{g(Q), 0} is com-
puted by
E [max{g(Q), 0}] =
￿ ∞
0


















Differentiating with respect to Q gives,








































= E [∂g(Q)/∂Q|g(Q) > 0]P (g(Q) > 0). (2.32)
The result follows from the following relation
E [max{g(Q), 0}] = E
￿
g(Q)
￿￿ g(Q) > 0
￿
P (g(Q) > 0) . (2.33)
We develop optimality conditions for (y∗, r∗) by performing marginal analysis on
(2.24). For notational simplicity, let us define γ := ξ − u = βw − ηβw − z − ρr. For
example, e = min{(ξ − u)+, y} = min{γ+, y}.
2.6.1.1 Marginal lateral transshipment costs
The expected cost of inventory lateral transshipment can be computed by











































from which the marginal costs of inventory lateral transshipment are obtained as






= ∆cPr (γ > y) (2.35)
and























y − γ+ > 0
￿
. (2.36)
From the additivity and linearity properties of conditional expectation,
E
￿




















y − γ+ > 0
￿
. (2.37)





































E [y | y − γ+ > 0]Pr (y − γ+ > 0) = 0. Thus, we can further simplify (2.36)
as



































































￿￿￿￿ y − γ > 0, γ > 0
￿
Pr (y − γ > 0, γ > 0)
= −∆cE [ρ | γ > 0, γ < y]Pr (γ > 0, γ < y) . (2.39)
2.6.1.2 Marginal overstock costs
The expected cost of overstock at the forward production system is
hME
￿




y −min{γ+, y}− ζ
￿+￿
. (2.40)
It is easy to see that the partial derivatives with respect to y and r have nonzero
values only when γ+ < y and y− γ+ − ζ > 0. Note that the former is implied by the
later.
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A conditional expectation of (2.40) is given by
hME
￿




y −min{γ+, y}− ζ
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+ + ζ > y
￿
(2.41)
The marginal costs of overstock at the forward production system are
hM∂E
￿
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y − γ+ − ζ












y − γ − ζ
￿￿ γ > 0, γ + ζ < y
￿




￿￿ γ > 0, γ + ζ < y
￿
× Pr (γ > 0, γ + ζ < y) . (2.43)
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The partial derivative of (2.44) with respect to y is always zero. This follows from
the observation that the coefficient of y is nonzero only when γ+ > y and γ < y,
which happen with probability zero. To see this, let us consider the following two
cases: (i) if γ < 0, then Pr(γ < y < γ+) = Pr(γ < y < 0) = 0 and (ii) if γ > 0,
Pr(γ < y < γ+) = Pr(γ < y < γ) = Pr(γ = y) = 0. This implies that an increase in
y cannot overstock the inventory of the reverse production system, which is intuitive
because inventory lateral transshipment is made only to compensate the shortage for
the reverse production system.
The partial derivative of (2.44) with respect to r is nonzero only when γ < 0.
Let us consider the following three cases: (i) γ+ < y and γ > 0, (ii) γ+ < y and
γ < 0, and (iii) γ+ > y and y − γ > 0. In case (i), the value of the expectation
becomes zero. In case (ii), the condition is equivalent to γ < 0 because this implies
γ
+ = 0 < y. This gives a nonzero coefficient of r in (2.44). The inequalities in case
(iii) is equivalent to γ < y < γ+ which happens with probability zero. Thus, the





















￿￿ γ < 0
￿




￿￿ γ < 0
￿
Pr (γ < 0) . (2.45)
Intuitively, overstock occurs for the reverse production system when there are more
recovered products than requests for warranty service as implied by the inequality
γ < 0, i.e., ξ < u.
51
2.6.1.3 Marginal shortage costs
The expected cost of shortage at the forward production system is
kME
￿




ζ +min{γ+, y}− y
￿+￿
. (2.46)
The marginal costs of overstock with respect to y at the forward production system
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y − ζ < γ+ < y
￿
. (2.47)
Similarly, the marginal costs of overstock with respect to r at the forward production













ζ + γ − y
￿￿ γ > 0, y − ζ < γ < y
￿
(2.48)




￿￿ γ > 0, y − ζ < γ < y
￿
× Pr (γ > 0, y − ζ < γ < y) (2.49)
The negative marginal costs increase in either y or u, which helps reduce the shortage
penalty incurred by the forward production system.
The expected cost of shortage at the reverse production system is
kRE
￿








The nonzero marginal cost of (2.50) with respect to y is obtained when γ+ > y and
















> y, γ > y
￿
= −kRPr (γ > y) . (2.51)





















> y, γ > y
￿
= −kRE[ρ
￿￿ γ > y]Pr (γ > y) . (2.52)
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2.6.1.4 Optimality conditions for (y∗, r∗)
From (2.35), (2.42), (2.47), and (2.51),
∂L(y, r)/∂y = ∆cPr (γ > y) + hMPr
￿
γ




y − ζ < γ+ < y
￿
− kRPr (γ > y)
= ∆cPr (γ > y) + hMPr
￿
γ
















− kRPr (γ > y)
= −(kR −∆c − kM)Pr (γ > y)
+ (hM + kM)Pr
￿
γ
+ + ζ < y
￿
− kM
= −(kR −∆c − kM)Pr (γ > y)
+ (hM + kM) (Pr (ζ < y)− Pr (y − γ < ζ < y))− kM (2.53)
and from (2.36), (2.43), (2.45), (2.48), and (2.52),
∂L(y, r)
∂r




￿￿ γ > 0, γ + ζ < y
￿




￿￿ γ < 0
￿




￿￿ γ > 0, y − ζ < γ < y
￿
Pr (γ > 0, y − ζ < γ < y)
− kRE[ρ
￿￿ γ > y]Pr (γ > y) (2.54)
Using the relation
E[ρ
￿￿ γ > y]Pr (γ > y) = E[ρ]− E[ρ
￿￿ γ < 0]Pr (γ < 0)
− E[ρ
￿￿ 0 < γ < y]Pr (0 < γ < y) (2.55)
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(2.54) can be rearranged as
∂L(y, r)
∂r




￿￿ 0 < γ < y − ζ
￿








(y − ζ)+ < γ < y
￿
+ (kR + hR)E[ρ
￿￿ γ < 0]Pr (γ < 0)
− kRE[ρ] (2.56)
The result follows from (2.53) and (2.56).
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CHAPTER III
Integration of Channel Decisions in a
Decentralized Closed-Loop Supply Chain With
Retailer Collection Under Deterministic
Non-Stationary Demands
3.1 Introduction
Recovery of postconsumer products is becoming an important strategy for realiz-
ing profitable and sustainable supply chains. The benefits of product recovery could
be substantial from the perspectives of economic development, business and consumer
value, and societal concern for environmental protection. Manufacturers can benefit
from reduction of production costs, reduced consumption of raw-materials, enhanced
corporate image, and market share protection. For example, Xerox Corporation saves
hundreds of million of dollars a year by collecting, recovering, and reusing its post-
consumer photocopiers (Maslennikova and Foley , 2000). Kumazawa and Kobayashi
(2006) show a Life Cycle Simulation (LCS) example in which recovery of notebook
computers increases business profits by 20%. Society also benefits from reduction
of waste to landfills and employment growth due to the labor intensive character-
istics of product recovery processes. As a result of carpet recycling efforts in the
U.S., more than 1.3 billion pounds of postconsumer carpets have been diverted from
landfill since 2002 (Carpet America Recovery Effort , 2008). Annual energy savings
from product recovery are estimated at 120 trillion BTU (Pearce, 2009). In the UK,
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more than 50,000 people are employed in the remanufacturing industry, contribut-
ing about £5 billion to GDP (Oakdene Hollins , 2007). Examples that would best
explain the benefit, as well as necessity of, product recovery are postconsumer elec-
tronic products. About 82% (1.84 million tons) of e-waste was disposed of primarily
in landfills in the U.S. in 2007, with about two thirds of those in the waste stream
still in working condition (Environmental Protection Agency , 2010; The University
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Sustainable Technology Center , 2009). Whereas one
ton of electronic scrap from personal computers could contain more gold than 17 tons
of gold ore (U.S. Geological Survey , 2001), e-waste contains leachable lead, mercury,
and brominated flame retardants and hence could pose a threat to water and soil
through mobilized contaminants. As such, manufacturers can reclaim potential eco-
nomic value as well as protect the environment by recovering postconsumer products.
Many manufacturers, however, face challenges when they engage in product re-
covery. In particular, they need to answer the following questions.
• How should manufacturers collect postconsumer products?
• Under what conditions manufacturers can perform profitable product recovery?
• What is the influence of market demand on decision-making associated with
product recovery?
In this chapter we repeat the results reported in Lee et al. (2011), where we address
the above problems from a two stage supply chain perspective. More specifically, we
consider the optimal strategic channel decisions for a manufacturer and a retailer in
a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), i.e., supply chains for collecting and recovering
postconsumer materials.
The retailer collects postconsumer products on behalf of the manufacturer through-
out a product life cycle where demand first grows and then declines. Manufacturers
are generally motivated to use retailers as a collection network because this avoids
investment in parallel infrastructure. Therefore it is assumed the manufacturer is will-
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ing to give incentives to the retailer to participate in the reverse production activities.
Similarly, the retailer can potentially benefit not only from the financial incentives
offered by the manufacturer, but may also benefit from the increased foot traffic and
favorable consumer perceptions.
The inclusion of return flows from retailer to manufacturer forces the consider-
ation of a number of tradeoffs. The manufacturer may realize cost savings using
return flows. However, if the retailer is the collection agent, the manufacturer can-
not directly control return flows arising from the market. The only way to influence
the amount of return flows is to motivate the retailer, using appropriate incentives,
to collect the best level of returns for the manufacturer. Therefore, it is important
for the manufacturer to influence the retailer’s optimal decisions in both the reverse
and forward channels in order to acquire the necessary amount of return volume.
In addition, the retailer and manufacturer may pursue increased sales by utilizing
return flows. The retailer is left to decide the optimal level of effort to expend on
both forward and return flows, given the incentives provided by the manufacturer in
pursuit of their own profit maximizing objective. A similar situation can be found in
Hewlett Packard’s new recycling program which uses authorized retail recycling loca-
tions for collecting end-of-life printer cartridges. Benefits include easier access to used
cartridges and collection costs savings from consolidation and bulk transportation of
returned cartridges. Staples, one of the HP authorized retail recycling locations, gives
a store reward of $3/unit to those who return their used printer cartridge to one of
its retailing network locations.
Static game vs. differential game Static models, i.e., single-period decision-
making models where parameters and decision variables do not change over time,
have been widely used for explaining decision-making in supply chains. However,
results and insights obtained from such models do not necessarily capture important
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aspects of system behavior which can only be understood through dynamic models.
Timely collection and recovery of postconsumer products is critical for the profitability
of the entire supply chain, particularly when products exhibit short life cycle and
fast depreciation, as with electronic products. In order to properly address such
situations, we approach the research problems using a dynamic game model in which
a manufacturer and a retailer engage in forward and reverse production activities,
each pursing their own objectives. This is particularly relevant to the situations that
are characterized by
• short product life cycles due to rapid advances in technology,
• massive generation of end-of-use products that contain a high level of residual
value, and
• time-varying market demand that impacts interactive decision-making over time.
These are the cases where a differential game model is useful for understanding tem-
poral aspects of optimal decision-making.
We identify profitability conditions for product recovery under time-varying mar-
ket situations. Also, we will discuss how the information on the characteristics of
reverse production processes can be used for finding profitable apportionment of prod-
uct recovery effort among players. These new insights contribute to the enhancement
of our understanding about the decision-making in closed-loop supply chains. This
helps us build profitable as well as sustainable supply chains.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2 we discuss
related literature, research approach, and key assumptions. Section 3.3 reports on
the solution to the model and some interpretations. In section 3.4 we draw useful
insights on the decision mechanisms in closed-loop supply chains. Section 3.5 provides
conclusions.
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3.2 Methodology and Assumptions
Early research in product recovery in closed-loop supply chains was primarily con-
cerned with technical issues such as disassembly, remanufacturing, and reassembly of
used products. After two decades, the related fields have developed into one that en-
compasses diverse disciplines such as supply chain, economics, and marketing (Guide
and Van Wassenhove, 2009). For a general review of research into sustainable product
recovery, we refer readers to (Gungor and Gupta, 1999; Ilgin and Gupta, 2010).
In this chapter we attempt to obtain new insights on profitable product recovery by
considering reverse production processes in two-echelon forward and reverse channels
under time-varying market demands. Differential game theoretic frameworks have
been used to represent conventional forward supply distribution systems, e.g., (Pekel-
man, 1974; Eliashberg and Steinberg , 1987; Hartl , 1995). He et al. (2007) provide an
excellent review of Stackelberg differential game models in forward supply chains. In
CLSC literature, Kiesmüller et al. (2004) address a dynamic product recovery issue
involved in the case of automotive engine remanufacturing, but there exists only a
single decision maker. Savaskan et al. (2004) analyze decentralized reverse channel
structures in a static environment. However, we have not found any research that
addresses the decentralized decision-making in a CLSC under time-varying environ-
ment. Our research fills this gap by extending existing studies and contributes to the
literature by characterizing dynamic decision-making in CLSC under time-varying
market demands. While we consider deterministic situations rather than stochastic
ones to obtain analytical solutions, this would not limit the validity of interpretation
of the solution on strategic level decisions.
The research is based on a decentralized two-echelon supply chain model in which
the manufacturer engages in product recovery and the retailer in distribution and
collection, respectively. In this chapter we consider the case where new and recovered
products are assumed to be equivalent. This assumption applies to many products
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such as single-use cameras and printer cartridges (Majumder and Groenevelt , 2001).
Accordingly, we describe the state of each agent using one state variable, that is, the
inventory level. The dynamics of each agent’s behavior is then modeled by a differen-
tial equation which represents the rate of change in inventory level over time under the
retailer’s re-order and manufacturer’s production policy as well as exogenous variation
in potential demand for the product.
Sequence of decision-making in the Stackelberg game We assume that the
manufacturer leads the decision-making in the forward and reverse channels:
1. The manufacturer moves first by setting its wholesale price, collection incen-
tive, and production quantity. The manufacturer is assumed to commit to the
decision once it is made.
2. The retailer then observes the manufacturer’s decision and follows by determin-
ing its retail price, buyback price, and order quantity.
The manufacturer takes into account the retailer’s best reaction to its decision-
making. Thus, the sequence of analysis proceeds backward as we will show in section
3.3. The model captures (i) conflict of interests between two players, (ii) external
and internal time-varying dynamics, and (iii) the leader-follower relationship. A dif-
ferential game (to account for (i) and (ii)) with a Stackelberg solution (for (iii)) can
represent these features and is the basis for our mathematical model and analysis.
The model is depicted in Figure 3.1. There are two streams of material flows:
forward flows and return flows. The forward flows are initiated by the demand signal
d(t) and the return flows are triggered by the incentive sM . Forward flow originates
from the supplier who ships raw materials to the manufacturer at the unit price pS.
The manufacturer receives raw materials of amount qM(t), processes the materials
into finished goods incurring production cost measured by fM(·), and delivers the
products to the retailer at the unit wholesale price pM . The retailer receives the
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Figure 3.1: The manufacturer-retailer closed-loop supply chain model. The manufac-
turer moves first by determining pM , sM , and qM(t). The retailer then
observes the OEM’s decision and follows by determining pR(t), sR(t), and
qR(t).
products of amount qR(t) at time t, processes them incurring handling cost fR(·), and
sells the final products in the market at the unit retail price pR(t). Customer demands
are assumed to be immediately satisfied without backlogging. These unidirectional
forward flows of materials would have been disposed of by the customer if there had
not been product take-back efforts. Note that the underlying assumption for the
production costs fR(·) and fM(·) is finite production efficiency for both firms. It
is clear that production costs can be ignored when the production efficiencies are
infinite.
Production take-back is initiated by the incentive signal sM which is offered to
the retailer by the manufacturer. The retailer then determines an appropriate level of
take-back effort sR(t), e.g., the financial incentive given to the customer as a reward
for returning a postconsumer product, to collect used products from the market. The
amount of collected returns is γ(t) and these are transferred to the manufacturer at
the price of sM for each unit of returns. Finally, the collected materials are received
and reprocessed by the manufacturer and join the forward flow.
One possible issue in modeling reverse channels is the time delay which is caused
by, for instance, product residence time in market. It is known that the delay in the
reverse channel can be reduced by employing a product take-back program in which
customers are rewarded for returning their products (Debo et al., 2006). Note also
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that in our model the remanufactured product is a perfect substitute for the new
product. Thus, we simplify the model by assuming zero delay in the reverse channel
and remanufacturing.
Both firms utilize inventories to accommodate increasing demands—the so called
production smoothing strategy. This represents a number of cases where increasing
marginal costs of production prevails. Cachon et al. (2007) analyze unadjusted sea-
sonal data to report that predictable demands and convex production costs are strong
motivations for production smoothing. On the other hand, we shall assume stockless
policies for return flows of materials. That is, return flows are assumed to be imme-
diately transferred to the manufacturer as soon as they are collected. This reflects
the lack of desirability of holding this inventory at the retailer.
The retailer’s decision variables, pR(t) and qR(t) for the forward channel and sR(t)
for the reverse channel, are all functions of time driven by the change in potential
demands. As an example, this dynamic pricing strategy represents the situations in
e-commerce retailing channels (e.g., expedia.com) where intertemporal pricing strate-
gies have been widely adopted in recent years with advances in information technol-
ogy (Chan et al., 2004). On the other hand, the manufacturer’s pricing decisions pM
and sM are assumed to be constants throughout the planning horizon. This reflects
the commonly practiced long-term contracts between manufacturers and retailers.
Although a fixed price contract does not generally coordinate the supply chain (Ca-
chon, 2003), we choose this simple contract type in order to maintain our focus on
investigating the interrelated decision mechanism in forward and reverse channels.
However, the manufacturer’s production decision qM(t) is a function of time since the
manufacturer has to respond to the time-varying re-order quantities qR(t) requested
by the retailer.
The planning horizon consists of a product life cycle. We provide detailed discus-
sion for key assumptions before presenting the formal description of the model.
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Assumption III.1 (Stackelberg game). This is a non-zero-sum noncooperative dy-
namic game between the manufacturer and the retailer. The information structure is
asymmetric and hierarchical with the manufacturer being the leader and the retailer
the follower: the retailer has an a priori knowledge of the leader’s decision, and the
manufacturer, who has the dominant economic power over the retailer, credibly com-
mits itself to the initial decision. Thus, both firms accept a Stackelberg equilibrium as
their optimal strategies.
The Stackelberg gaming situation is commonly observed in many supply chain sys-
tems where one player possesses dominant power over the other players, thus imposing
a strategy which is favorable to itself (Cachon and Netessine, 2004). Depending on
the situations, the manufacturer or the retailer becomes the dominant player. In this
research, we choose the manufacturer as the Stackelberg leader because in typical
cases, it is the manufacturer, as the final ‘consumer’ of the return flows, who not only
decides whether or not to take-back post-consumer materials, but also performs core
product recovery jobs in its facility.
In many cases, market demands exhibit an ‘increasing-decreasing’ pattern over
time. A simple approach to modeling time-varying potential demand is to use a
concave quadratic function, a(t) = −c1t2 + c2t + c3, c1, c2, c3 > 0. The coefficients
are determined by parameters of average demand and the magnitude of the overall
demand change. We define the time average ā and the average squared spread δ20,
i.e., the predictable or deterministic variation, of the deterministic non-stationary
potential demands throughout the product life cycle of length T . We then solve
a
￿(pT ) = 0, ā = (1/T )
￿
T
0 a(τ)dτ , and δ
2





dτ to determine the
coefficients c1, c2, and c3.
Assumption III.2 (The market). Let δ2(x) measure the average squared spread of
the time series x(t) about its average x̄ ≡ (1/T )
￿
T
0 x(τ)dτ throughout the planning





dτ . The deterministic non-stationary po-
64
tential demand a(t) having a time average ā and average squared spread δ20 about ā


















a(t) > 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
where ωp = (15p2 − 15p + 4)1/2 and a(t) attains its maximum value at t = pT ,
0 < p < 1.
The market linearly responds with a constant price sensitivity factor b, b > 0, to
the retailer’s marketing efforts pR(t). The demand function d(t) is characterized by
d(t) = a(t)− bpR(t), d(t) > 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
We choose a linear demand model because this makes the problem analytically
tractable, especially for a Stackelberg differential game which often fails to produce
a closed form solution. Lee and Staelin (1997) show that the specific form of the
demand function, whether it is linear or nonlinear, is not very important in analyzing
the hierarchical interactions within supply chains. The results obtained by a general
linear model often hold for an arbitrary nonlinear model (Milgrom, 1994) thereby
generalizing the results without involving unduly complicated analysis.
Assumption III.3 (Return flow). The amount of return flow γ(t) is linear with a
sensitivity factor β to the retailer’s reverse channel marketing effort sR(t):
γ(t) = βsR(t), β > 0. (3.2)
1
Potential demand a(t) is the maximum demand the system can capture at time t.
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We assume that the system can affect the market to generate return flows. Among
those methods for encouraging consumers to bring used products back to the closed-
loop supply chain, a buyback, or trade-in, program is considered to be an effective one
(Klausner and Hendrickson, 2000) and is thus widely practiced for remanufacturing
(Guide, 2000; Guide et al., 2003). An important requirement for a return flow model
is that, in a closed-loop supply chain system, the amount of returns should be less
than the cumulative sales. More specifically, we can specify the condition for the












γ(τ)dτ, ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
To implement the above idea in a manageable form, we shall assume that the po-
tential amount of returns at time t is always less than the amount of sales at time
t, for all t in [0, T ]. This is a stricter condition because we enforce the “less-than”
relationship between return flows and forward flows at each moment in time rather
than in cumulative sense. Let ρ(t)d(t) be the potential return flows at time t with
ρ(t), 0 ≤ ρ(t) ≤ 1, being the correlation coefficient between the forward and return
flows. The return volume is generally, especially in trade-in cases, correlated with the






where we assume that the retailer captures the fraction, sR(t)/pR(t), of the potential
amount of return flows. Using the expression for d(t), we have











The problem with the above model is that an analytical solution is intractable due
to the time-varying quantity βo(t), which can be interpreted as the sensitivity of
the return flow with respect to the buyback price at any point in time. In order to
facilitate an analytical procedure, we shall replace βo(t) with a constant parameter β








The parameter β in (3.2) is approximated by the value of β which can be interpreted
as the reverse flow sensitivity to the retailer’s reverse channel effort sR(t). Note that
if β > βo(t) for some t, then the retailer could collect more than the current demand
level with sR(t) < pR(t). Thus, we force feasibility by requiring β ≤ βo(t) for all
t ∈ [0, T ]. In this case, the cumulative amount of returns is always less than the
cumulative sales. To assume that return flows are consistent with the pattern of new




, ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
This means, as long as the retailer controls its retail price below the upper bound
a(t)/(β + b), the cumulative returns cannot exceed cumulative sales. Considering the
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fact that d(t) → 0 as pR(t) → a(t)/b and that β ￿ b in many real applications, an
optimal retail price p∗
R
(t) would be found well below the upper bound a(t)/(β + b).
In its simple form, the return flow model (3.2) enables us to obtain an insightful
analytical solution.
Assumption III.4 (Homogeneous product). We assume that new products and re-
manufactured products are homogeneous. That is, consumers do not distinguish be-
tween remanufactured and newly manufactured products, those two types of products
share the same inventory space, incur the same inventory holding costs, and are sold
at the same price.
Under this assumption one variable, the inventory level, is sufficient for describing
each firm’s state over time. In practical situations, those two kinds of products can
be homogeneous or heterogeneous depending on a variety of factors such as product
category, consumer preference, and so on. Single-use cameras manufactured by Kodak
would exemplify the homogeneous case. The company reports that virtually 100
percent of single-use cameras were manufactured from recycled bodies and/or parts
in 2007 (Kodak , 2007). On the other hand, consumers can be extremely product-type
conscious in their choice between new tires and retreaded tires (Debo et al., 2005).
A heterogeneous model should be applied in this case. Ferguson and Toktay (2006)
address a pricing decision under the competition between new and remanufactured
products. Our model takes a simpler perspective by assuming that new and recovered
products are equivalent, but addresses time-dependent decision making.
Since reverse production processes are generally labor intensive, if technologies or
skilled labor forces are available, it would be possible for the retailer to perform a
portion of the reverse production processes, in addition to the collection of returns,
in order to pursue additional revenue. This could result in production costs savings
for the manufacturer because of the relieved burden of reverse production activities.
The following assumption will be used for addressing such issues.
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Assumption III.5 (Division of Reverse Production Processes). We assume the fol-
lowing:
1. The production capacities of both firms are measured by a common unit.
2. Let φo
R
denote the units of production capacity the retailer uses to collect one unit
of return flow when one unit of production capacity is utilized for processing one
unit of forward flow. For any additional reverse production activity, the retailer
uses φR, 0 < φoR ≤ φR, units of production capacity to process one unit of return
flow.
3. The manufacturer uses φM units of production capacity to process one unit of
return flow when one unit of production capacity is utilized for processing of
one unit of forward flow. Let φo
M
, 0 < φo
M
< 1, be the value of φM when the
retailer’s reverse production activity includes only the collection of returns.
4. If an additional portion of the reverse production processes is taken on by the
retailer, then ∆φM = φoM − φM > 0. This in turn determines the value of φR
such that φR = g(φM), where g is a mapping function that translates ∆φM to
∆φR.
When φM = φoM the manufacturer assumes full responsibility for the entire re-
verse production processes except the collection of returns which is performed by the
retailer. We limit the value of φo
M
to be less than one to reflect the manufacturer’s
wish to use less effort for the recovery of a used product than for the manufacturing
of a new product.
Example III.1. Let us suppose that the production capacity of each firm is measured
by ‘person-hours (PH).’ The manufacturer uses 10 PH to manufacture one unit of raw
material into a finished good; the retailer uses 2 PH to customize a product into a
final product that meets specific requirements of a customer order. The manufacturer





= 6/10 = 0.6. In this example, the retailer’s production capacity usage rate
for the reverse production activities is assumed to be expressed by φR = g(φM) =
−6.045+5.075φM +1.806/φM .2 Three examples of the division of reverse production
processes are shown in Figure 3.2.
Assumption III.6 (Production costs). We assume the following:
1. Any available production capacity such as personnel, equipment, working time,
and space can be used for processing either forward flows or return flows;
2. The manufacturer and the retailer have finite production efficiencies KR and
KM (unit2/$), respectively, where ‘unit’ represents the unit of production ca-
pacity (e.g., person-hours);
3. The production costs of both firms are quadratic convex in the amount of pro-
duction capacity utilized.
The resulting production cost functions are characterized by
fM(qM + φMγ) = (qM + φMγ)
2
/KM , 0 ≤ φM ≤ 1 (3.3a)
fR(qR + φRγ) = (qR + φRγ)
2
/KR, φR ≥ 0 (3.3b)
for the manufacturer and the retailer, respectively.
In practical situations, forward and return flows may share some, if not 100%, of
production resources. Production resource sharing between forward and return flows
is mentioned in, for example, Guide (2000) and Bayindir et al. (2005). According
to Debo et al. (2006), Hewlett-Packard uses a flexible manufacturing system for new
production and remanufacturing of servers.
As for the cost structure of material processing, we assume increasing marginal
costs of production. Production costs often exhibit scale economies up to a certain
2
The function g(φM ) is arbitrarily chosen for an illustration.
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(a) Production capacity consumption rates (PH = Person Hours)
(b) Three examples for the division of the reverse production processes
(c) Characteristic curve for dividing reverse production processes in Example III.1
Figure 3.2: Illustration of Example III.1. The earlier part (e.g., disassembly and
sorting) of the above reverse production process is labor intensive and
does not require advanced technology. This enables the retailer performs
well for this part of the product recovery procedure. As a result, the
retailer uses 1 PH for the part of reverse production process shown in case
B. However, the later part (e.g., cleaning/repair) requires skilled labor
and specific remanufacturing technology. Hence, in case C, the retailer
needs 8 PH whereas the manufacture uses only 4 PH for the portion of the
reverse production process assigned to the retailer. The curve φR = g(φM)
represents this aspect of the reverse production process.
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quantity, and after this point diseconomies of scale come in effect. The key tradeoffs
for both the manufacturer and retailer depend on how the production cost functions
scale with throughput. In many manufacturing environments there are economies of
scale with larger throughputs either because of the use of slack capacity or increased
efficiencies with larger batches. We assume that these economies have already been
achieved within the system and consider the case where each additional unit of pro-
duction, or sales, is increasingly expensive, increasing marginal cost. This is the
interesting case, because with decreasing marginal cost, the decision will be to use
capacity to its maximum extent, all other things being equal. More importantly,
this motivates firms to accumulate inventory to buffer future high demands. For lin-
ear production cost structures, there would be no incentive for firms to accumulate
inventory because of the constant marginal costs of production.
3.3 The Model and Solution
In this section we present the optimization problems and the solutions for both
firms, and make some observations about the implications of these solutions. The
analysis of the Stackelberg game proceeds in the following sequence:
1. The profit maximization problem of the retailer is solved for a given wholesale
price pM and an incentive sM . This gives a mathematical expression for the
retailer’s best response to the manufacturer’s decision.
2. The profit maximization problem of the manufacturer is solved using the re-





and production quantity q∗
M
(t).





mathematical expression for the retailer’s best response.
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The Stackelberg equilibria are obtained by these three steps and are shown in section
3.3.2.
3.3.1 Retailer’s problem and solution
Let the inventory level IR(t) represent the state of the retailer at time t with
associated unit holding cost hR. The retailer’s profit at time t is
JR(IR, pR, qR, sR, t) = pRd− pMqR − fR(qR + φRγ)− hRIR + (sM − sR)γ
= pR (a− bpR)− pMqR − (qR + φRβsR)2/KR
− hRIR + (sM − sR)βsR.
The retailer wishes to maximize the total profit by controlling the retail price
pR(t), re-ordering rate qR(t), and the buyback price sR(t) throughout the planning





JR(IR, pR, qR, sR, t)dt (3.4)
subject to
İR(t) = qR(t)− d(pR(t)) (3.5a)
qR(t) ≥ 0 (3.5b)




sR(t) ≤ sM (3.5d)
IR(t) ≥ 0 (3.5e)
IR(0) = 0 and IR(T ) ≥ 0. (3.5f)
One of the manufacturer’s decision variables, i.e., production quantity qM(t), does
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not appear in the retailer’s model because we assume that the retailer has no concern
for the production capacity of the manufacturer. In other words, it is assumed that
the manufacturer can always meet the demand of the retailer, and hence the manu-
facturing cost is only visible to the retailer through the manufacturer’s prices. The
above formulation is an optimal control problem which can be solved by Pontryagin’s
Maximum Principle (Pontryagin et al., 1962). We find the retailer’s best response as
follows.
Proposition III.1 (The retailer’s best response). For the following nonnegative pol-














































































































tR ≤ t ≤ T ;
(3.6c)























a(τ)dτ 0 ≤ t < tR;





≡ KR + φ2Rβ and xRi refers to the decision xR in the ith phase policy.
In doing so, the retailer buffers the peak demands with inventory, if the unit holding







If (3.8) is violated, the retailer applies the second phase policy from the beginning.
A larger value for δ0, in the right hand side of (3.8) allows more expensive holding
costs for the two-phase policy—a reasonable result as one of the roles of inventory
is a buffer for demand variability. On the other hand, the production efficiency KR
could be high enough (i.e., low production costs) making the inventory policy less
attractive compared to ‘just-in-time production.’ If the inventory cost is relatively
expensive, the retailer may begin the operation using the second phase policy with
tR = 0. For those cases where the holding cost is moderate such that hR satisfies
(3.8), there exists a policy switching time tR. We observe that throughout the two




(t) are primarily characterized by the
market potential a(t).
Competition between forward and return flows The buyback price (3.6c)
follows a pattern which is opposite to that of the market potential a(t). The buyback
price begins linearly decreasing in the first phase and then goes in the direction
opposite to the rate of change in market potential. This implies that the retailer’s
efforts in the forward and reverse channels are negatively correlated. The main reason
for this is the finite production efficiency, which induces competition between forward
and return flows within the retailer’s production system. This holds for increasing
or decreasing marginal costs of production, as well as for non-stationary return flow
potential. One can easily identify several factors such as a low price sensitivity, a
low resource price, and a large market that boosts the competitive power of forward
75
flows. In those cases, the retailer would be more inclined to process forward flows
rather than return flows simply because the former is more profitable. This tradeoff
in the retailer’s incentives can make it harder for the manufacturer to obtain enough
returns, unless the retailer is sufficiently rewarded by the manufacturer for its efforts
in the reverse channel. In other words, the retailer’s view of return flow is different
from the manufacturer, who has immediate incentives for obtaining a greater return
volume to save manufacturing costs. This is one potential cause of difficulties for the
manufacturer in increasing return volumes.
Let us now investigate the retailer’s time-varying inventory policy (3.7). We first
observe that the production rate should be greater than the demand rate in the
beginning of the planning horizon; otherwise, some demands will be lost because
initial inventory is zero for both players. Since the production rate q∗
R
(t) is linear
in the first phase and the demand rate d(p∗
R
(t)) follows a concave path, there must





(t). This is necessary for the existence of policy switching time tR. Recall
that İR(t) = qR(t) − d(pR(t)). Therefore, the inventory path follows an increasing-
decreasing trajectory up to the switching time tR, and remains zero for the remaining
time. From the solution we know that the second phase stockless policy comes in
effect when cumulative quantities of production and demands become equal for the
first time for t > 0.
One useful approach to investigate the influence of reverse production activities on
the forward channel decisions is to compare the best channel decision in the CLSC to
that of the counterpart system, namely the open-loop supply chain system, in which
only forward production occurs. For the variable or parameter in closed-loop supply
chain, say x(·) , let x̃(·) denote the corresponding quantity in the open-loop system.
Once we obtain x(·), it is straightforward to derive x̃(·) by setting all values of β, φR,
φM , and sM in x∗(·) to zero.
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The policy switching time tR can be interpreted as the length of the inventory
period that begins at time 0. It is apparent from the expression of tR that the
retailer’s inventory carrying period increases for a greater amount of time-varying
changes, δ0, embedded in the potential market demand a(t). It is a simple matter of
algebra to show that tR < t̃0R, that is, the retailer’s inventory period becomes shorter
in the closed-loop supply chain. A shorter inventory carrying period for a fixed unit
holding cost hR may imply less costs, or an increase in production efficiency as we will
discuss in Section 3.4.1. It can also be shown that the retailer’s inventory carrying
period becomes shorter for a larger return volume due to high return flow sensitivity
β or a larger value of φR—the retailer’s effective production efficiency K ￿R increases
in either case. A shorter inventory carrying period as an outcome of the reverse
production activities would certainly be an incentive for the retailer to participate in
the closed-loop supply chain.
3.3.2 Manufacturer’s problem and solution
The manufacturer makes its decision anticipating the best response from the re-
tailer. The manufacturer’s profit at time t is characterized by
JM(IM , pM , qM , sM , t) = pMq
∗
R
− pSqM − fM(qM + φMγ(s∗R))




− pSqM − (qM + φMβs∗R)2/KM
− hMIM − sMβs∗R,
where the state variable IM is the inventory level of the manufacturer.
Since we assume that two decision variables pM and sM do not change over time,
we can formulate the manufacturer’s problem into a two-stage optimization problem
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as is used by Eliashberg and Steinberg (1987).
max
pM ,sM
πM(pM , sM) (3.9)




≤ sM ≤ pS
where





JM(IM , pM , qM , sM , t)dt (3.10)
subject to






qM(t) ≥ 0 (3.11b)
IM(t) ≥ 0 (3.11c)
IM(0) = 0 and IM(T ) ≥ 0. (3.11d)
Solving the problem described by (3.10) and (3.11) gives the following solution.
Proposition III.2 (Optimal production quantity of the manufacturer). For the fol-






















(KMhM + φRφMβhR) (t− tR) + q∗M2(tR) 0 ≤ t < tR
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(tR) tR ≤ t < tM
0 tM ≤ t ≤ T
where K ￿
R
≡ KR + φ2Rβ, K ￿￿R ≡ K ￿R + (1− φM)φRβ, and xMi refers to the decision xM
in the ith phase policy.








Unlike the case of the retailer, the manufacturer’s decision on the adoption of the
above inventory policy depends upon both firms’ production efficiencies. For example,
if the manufacturer’s production efficiency is higher than that of the retailer, then
the manufacturer may be better off carrying inventories for a shorter period or none,
if possible, because the manufacturer’s relatively high production efficiency enables
it to flexibly respond to retailer’s requests incurring small production costs.
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For the case where the unit holding cost hM satisfies (3.12), the manufacturer
operates the system using the above policy. In the first phase, production rate q∗
M1
(t)
is linear in the manufacturer’s holding cost as well as in the retailer’s holding cost. If
there were no return flows, the retailer’s holding cost would not affect the production
rate of the manufacturer. Why do return flows bring the influence of hR into q∗M(t)
in the first phase when 0 ≤ t < tR? This originates from two aspects of the retailer’s
decision mechanism. First, there are tradeoffs between inventory costs and production
costs. Second, return flows compete with forward flows within the retailer’s system.
The retailer’s holding cost in this situation plays a certain role in determining the level
of its reverse channel efforts s∗
R
(t) as we see in (3.6c). Consequently, thus generated
return flows of materials carry the influence of the inventory holding cost hR to the
manufacturer’s production decision q∗
M1
(t). Note that hR does not appear in q∗M2(t)
and q∗
M3
(t) since the retailer goes stockless for t > tR.
Similar to the case of the retailer, the policy switching time tM represents the
length of the manufacturer’s inventory carrying period which, as we see in the ex-
pression of tM , increases for a greater value of δ0. However, contrary to the case of
the retailer, it can be shown that the manufacturer carries inventories for a longer
period than in the case of open-loop system, i.e., tM > t̃0M . The reason for this is
that the manufacturer now faces time-varying changes coming from return flows of
materials. If we let ∆tM ≡ tM − t̃0M , then we can show that ∂(∆tM)/∂β > 0 and
∂(∆tM)/∂φR > 0 for 0 ≤ φM ≤ 1, implying that the manufacturer’s inventory period
becomes longer for a larger return volume or a larger value of φR. These are the
cases in which the amount of materials flowing through the manufacturer’s produc-
tion system exhibits greater changes over time. Note that ∆tM → 0 and ∆tR → 0 as
φR → 0. In other words, there would be negligible changes in the inventory periods at
both firms if the retailer’s reverse production activities occupy a negligible portion of
its production capacity. If inventory costs are significant, the manufacturer may find
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it advantageous to design a reverse channel in which the retailer performs minimal
portion of reverse production processes.
In the next step, we solve the static optimization problem (3.9) for the man-
ufacturer. We will assume an interior solution because a boundary solution (e.g.,
wholesale price = retail price, wholesale price = raw material price, etc.) is highly
unlikely in real situations. Although boundary solutions are mathematically possible,
from a practical perspective, we are more interested in an interior solution.
Proposition III.3 (Optimal contract prices). Assuming an interior solution, the























k1 := βφM ((φM − 1) (b+KR)− bφR) + 2KM (b+K ￿R)
k2 := 2b (KM +KR) + bβ (1− φM + φR) (1− φM + 2φR)
+ βKR (φM − 1)2 + 2KMK ￿R






k4 := b (1− φM)K ￿￿R
k := 2b
￿
2KM +KR + β (1− φM + φR)2
￿







By inspecting these expressions we find that the manufacturer does not consider





. On the other
hand, the retailer’s decision is optimized for specific market conditions, i.e., both ā
and δ20. Accordingly, the retailer is more adaptable to time-varying conditions than
the manufacturer.
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The retailer’s equilibrium solution The retailer’s equilibrium solution is ob-




in the retailer’s best response obtained in Propo-
sition III.1.
Proposition III.4 (The retailer’s equilibrium solution). For the following nonnega-
































































































































































tR ≤ t ≤ T ;
(3.13c)
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a(τ)dτ 0 ≤ t < tR;




≡ KR + φ2Rβ, xRi refers to the decision xR in the ith phase policy, and
k1 := βφM ((φM − 1) (b+KR)− bφR) + 2KM (b+K ￿R)
k2 := 2b (KM +KR) + bβ (1− φM + φR) (1− φM + 2φR)
+ βKR (φM − 1)2 + 2KMK ￿R






k4 := b (1− φM)K ￿￿R
k := 2b
￿
2KM +KR + β (1− φM + φR)2
￿







In doing so, the retailer buffers the peak demands with inventory, if the unit holding







Observation III.1. For 0 < φM < 1, the optimal wholesale price p∗M and the optimal
transfer price s∗
M
increase in the potential demand ā. However, whereas s∗
M
increases
in the resource price pS, the optimal wholesale price p∗M decreases under increasing
pS if k1 < 0.
It is well understood that the manufacturer would raise p∗
M
under large potential
demands in view of the supply-demand relation in a noncompetitive situation. It
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also makes sense that the manufacturer would be inclined to collect more returns by
increasing sM when the resource price rises. An interesting question is: “What would
be the influence of a higher demand level on the manufacturer’s reverse channel
efforts?” One might think that it would be easier to collect returns as potential
demand grows since the potential return volume grows as well. The manufacturer
could then be able to collect the same amount of returns for less reverse channel
effort sM in a larger market. Our result is to the contrary. The manufacturer instead
should increase the reverse channel effort sM under a higher potential demand as the
coefficient of a in s∗
M
is positive. It can be shown from (3.6) that the retailer tends
to process more forward flows when demand potential a(t) increases, outweighing the
ease of collection.
One might also think that the manufacturer would also raise p∗
M
to recoup the
rise in production costs due to an increase in resource price. However, the result
demonstrates that under some conditions where k1 < 0 holds, the manufacturer
can lower the wholesale price even when the resource price rises. That is, firms
can utilize return flows to be robust to changes in resource price. This is possible,
for instance, when return flows are sufficiently responsive to the retailer’s collection
efforts (large value for β), the manufacturer processes more than the retailer in a
reverse productions (φR ￿ φM), and so on.
We have obtained optimal solutions for both firms. As an illustration, Figure 3.3
shows a numerical example for optimal decisions and inventory trajectories.
Remark III.1. The optimal solution found in this model shows zero terminal inventory,
i.e., I∗
M
(T ) = 0. However, unlike the retailer, the manufacturer may find it profitable
to stock non-zero terminal inventory which may be sold to other manufacturers or
retailers as resource materials at the end of product life cycle. In order to address
such situations we may further generalize the manufacturer’s problem by allowing a
nonzero terminal value for inventory. If we add a terminal value to the manufacturer’s
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Figure 3.3: A numerical example for optimal decisions and inventory trajectories
when hR = 1.5, hM = 1, KR = KM = 1, ā = 1000, δ0 = 50, p = 0.5,
T = 50, b = 1, pS = 400, φR = 0.0625, and φM = 0.6. Each player’s deci-
sion is characterized by two-phase policy, i.e., the inventory accumulating
phase and the stockless phase.
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objective functional (3.10), the solution may change such that I∗
M
(T ) > 0, depend-
ing on the value of terminal inventory and the marginal cost of production. As an
example, consider a terminal value vsIM(T ) for the manufacturer such that (3.10) is
replaced by





JM(IM , pM , qM , sM , t)dt+ vsIM(T ),
where vs is a unit salvage value. As we show in Appendix 3.6.2, we solve the dy-
namic optimization by using a costate variable λM(t) whose value is interpreted as
the shadow price of inventory. In other words, λ∗
M
(T ) implies the marginal cost of
accumulating additional inventory for the manufacturer at time t = T . This implies
that if the unit salvage value vs is larger than the cost λ∗M(T ), then the manufac-
turer has an incentive to stock non-zero terminal inventory IM(T ). In this case, the
manufacturer employs a second policy switching time to apply a three-phase optimal
policy. This may further encourage the manufacturer to collect more returns at a later
stage of product life cycle, e.g., by increasing s∗
M
. Since the retailer still responds to
the constant contract prices pM and sM , this change in the manufacturer’s objective
would not introduce a qualitative change in the dynamic property of the retailer’s
optimal decision unless the salvage value vs is made larger than the product price.
3.4 Decision Mechanisms in the Closed-Loop Supply Chain
In this section we discuss several important characteristics of optimal decisions in





identify what changes have to be made to the retailer’s decision when participating
in the reverse production activities. Next, we investigate the manufacturer’s deci-
sion structure to show when reverse production activity reduces the wholesale price.
Finally, we highlight the characteristics of the manufacturer’s resource consumption
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rate qM(t). We also address the characteristics of the manufacturer’s production
smoothing policy in the closed-loop supply chain.
3.4.1 Characteristics of the retailer’s optimal solution





the wholesale price pM increases.3 The reason for this is that return flows gain
competitive power as sources of additional revenue over forward flows. The retailer
spends more on the reverse channel while trying to recoup the increased purchasing





(t) for higher reward sM . Higher reward would naturally motivate
the retailer to exert more reverse channel effort, s∗
R
(t). The costs incurred by the
resulting increased reverse production activities are partly recouped through the retail
price.




require more careful attention than in the case of an open-loop supply chain.
We know that the manufacturer’s purpose for rewarding the retailer for the collection
of returns is to obtain an appropriate amount of reusable materials. However, given
finite production efficiency, there would be a certain limit on the total amount of
materials which can be economically handled by the retailer. Yet we may assume that
the manufacturer would not want the retailer to focus excessively on reverse channel
activities, if that ends up sacrificing a portion of the forward flows of materials. As
such, the retailer’s material processing volume would be possibly higher in a CLSC





should be directed in such a way that the retailer’s burden of material
handling is well compensated.
3
In real situations, there is some point at which the retail price does not keep increasing but stays
constant when the wholesale price increases.
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closed-loop system
Figure 3.4: Closed-loop production efficiency K ￿
R
for the retailer
Closed-loop production efficiency At this point, we can ask the following ques-
tion: “What changes does the retailer have to make to its decisions in order to cope
with the reverse production activities?” Interestingly, the retailer maintains its deci-
sions in a similar form to that of the corresponding open-loop system as we see in the




(t), we observe that the retailer’s
production efficiency in the CLSC appears increased from KR to K ￿R ≡ KR + φ2Rβ,
where KR and β have the same dimension (unit2/$), and φR is a dimensionless pa-
rameter. We call K ￿
R
the closed-loop production efficiency. Collecting returns would
result in an increased amount of materials flowing both directions through the re-
tailer’s facility which has to be more flexible to cope with such increased material
flows. The term φ2
R
β can be regarded as the additional flexibility for the retailer’s
production capacity. We can then interpret K ￿
R
as the way the retailer accounts for
the additional burden of material processing in its decision making. That is, the re-
tailer uses the closed-loop production efficiency K ￿
R
to address the influence of reverse
production activities and makes decisions in a similar way as it does in the open-loop
system (Figure 3.4).
To summarize, the influence of return flows on the retail price is twofold: while
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the reverse production activities incur costs that increase p∗
R
(t), the retailer makes
decisions using the closed-loop production efficiency K ￿
R
, which helps the retailer
reduce p∗
R
(t). As such, engaging in reverse production may not guarantee a lower




(t), ∀t ∈ [0, T ], as one might naturally expect. Rather,
two possibilities are of interest: (i) decreased pR(t) and greater demands, and (ii)
increased pR(t) and fewer demands. Although net profit might be larger in either
case than in the open-loop system, we are more interested in the first case for the
reason that a set of optimal decisions which not only maximizes the profit of each
individual player, but also generates larger demands, would be desirable from the
perspective of the long-term growth and viability of the supply chain network. In
light of this view, the following question naturally follows: under what conditions
can firms lower their prices? To answer this question, we investigate the decision
mechanism for the wholesale price which affects the retail price decision.
3.4.2 Decision mechanism of the wholesale price
We now consider the manufacturer’s decision making in the CLSC. The manufac-
turer would wish to realize lower production costs, a lower wholesale price, and more





conditions under which the manufacturer can achieve such objectives.
Proposition III.5. In closed-loop operation, the manufacturer can achieve a lower















− φM < 0,
(2φRKM + (φM − 1)KR)ā
2KMKR + b (2(φR + 1)KM + φMKR)
< pS
for 0 ≤ φM ≤ 1.
In order to satisfy the inequality in (i), φM and φR should be small enough for
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(continued from Example III.1). Three cases A, B,
and C in Example III.1 are shown to illustrate Proposition III.5. When
KM/KR = 1, the manufacturer can obtain a lower optimal wholesale price
by performing at least φc
M
= 0.44 in product recovery. Among A, B, and
C, case A is the only one that satisfies this condition. On the contrary,
cases B and C belong to the situation where φM < φcM = 0.44. In these
cases, the manufacturer has to satisfy the inequalities in (ii) in order to
obtain a lower optimal wholesale price by using return flows. However, if
the retailer’s production efficiency is more efficient than the manufacturer
such that KM/KR = 0.1, then φcM = 0.2 and all three cases A, B, and C
satisfy the inequality (i).
given production efficiencies KR and KM . If this is not the case, the manufacturer
has to satisfy an additional condition as we see in (ii). As such, it depends largely
on the characteristics of the reverse production processes, i.e., the mapping function
g(·) because the value of φR is determined by g(φM). For ease of exposition, we shall
consider three examples of division of reverse production processes in Example III.1
as are shown in Figure 3.5.
The curve φR = g(φM) represents feasible divisions, (φM ,φR), of the reverse pro-
duction processes. Using this information, we can obtain a ‘critical’ value, say φc
M
,
for given values of KR and KM such that the inequality (i) is satisfied for φM ≥ φcM .





if it wishes to obtain a lower optimal wholesale price by using return flows. If




, then the manufacturer has to check whether the inequalities in (ii) are
satisfied.
It turns out that the ratio of production efficiencies of both firms plays an im-
portant role in determining the profitable division of reverse production processes.
When KM/KR = 1, φcM = 0.44 and only case A satisfies the inequality in (i). This
is due to the characteristics of the hypothetical reverse production processes which
require more skilled labor or high technology in later stage of the processes. The re-
tailer has to use more production resources in cases B and C. Under such a situation,
the inequalities in (ii) have to be satisfied for the return flow to become competitive
enough over the forward flow so that there is a sufficient amount of return volume that
enables the manufacturer to obtain a lower optimal wholesale price. On the other
hand, the retailer will be able to economically accommodate more reverse production
processes if its production efficiency is high. As the retailer becomes more efficient,
i.e., a decrease in the ratio KM/KR, the value of φcM becomes smaller and more cases
satisfy the inequality in (i).
The example shown in Figure 3.5 belongs to an intermediate case of two extremes
shown in Figure 3.6. In one extreme case g(φM) approaches an ‘L’ shape such that
the retailer is efficient for the majority of the reverse production process. This would
be the cases where product recovery is simple. For example, more and more major
cell phone carriers (e.g., AT&T, Verizon, etc.) refurbish and resell cell phones. In
this case, retailers are more efficient in product recovery activities such as program
reset and repackaging than manufacturers. Reverse material flows may not need to
proceed up to the manufacturer because most of the product recovery processes can be
economically performed by the retailer. In the other extreme g(φM) approaches a ‘
L
’
shape such that the manufacturer is efficient for the majority of the reverse production
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Figure 3.6: Two extreme cases of g(φM). More and more major cell phone carriers
(e.g., AT&T, Verizon, etc.) refurbish and resell cell phones. In this cases,
retailers can efficiently handle the entire product recovery processes. On
the contrary, recovery of photo copiers and lead acid batteries require spe-
cific technique and equipments which may only be economically operated
by manufacturers. For intermediate cases, the model can be used to find
a profitable division of reverse production process for a given g(φM).
process. Product recovery which requires specialized technology, equipment, or labor
would belong to this case. An example is the recycling of lead-acid batteries. The
recycling rate of lead-acid batteries is more than 98% in the U.S., but the recycling
process may not be safely and economically performed by the retailer due to sulfuric
acid and lead, both of which are toxic. Another example is the recovery of used
photo copiers where manufacturers are responsible for most of the recovery processes
such as disassembly, cleaning, inspection, sorting, reconditioning, and reassembly.
Whereas the division of recovery processes would be obvious for such extreme cases,
the approach in this research can be useful for finding a profitable apportionment of
product recovery effort among participating firms, especially for intermediate cases
where an optimal allocation of reverse production activities is not obvious.
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3.4.3 Resource input stream q∗
M
(t)
One of the purposes of using return flows is to reduce raw material consumption,
which is represented by the quantity q∗
M
(t) in our model. While we pursue a lower level
of raw material consumption in the closed-loop supply chains, we are also interested in
the qualitative change in q∗
M
(t), i.e., the relative change in the time-varying dynamic
property, since this could influence the production plans of the manufacturer as well as
the supplier. In order to investigate the characteristics of the time-varying dynamics
of the resource input stream q∗
M
(t), we shall use the measure δ2(qM). Recall that
the value δ2(x) represents the extent of changes that x(t) undergoes over time. For
instance, we constructed the market potential a(t) in (3.1) such that δ2(a) = δ20.








) are determined by the slopes KMhM + φRφMβhR and





) for KM ≈ KR,
hM < hR, and φR ￿ φM . Note that we also have δ2(q̃∗M) < δ2(q̃∗R) in this case.
Contrary to this, in the time interval [tM , T ], we find that q∗M(t) undergoes change














Differentiation with respect to each parameter reveals that the above ratio (i) increases
in return flows sensitivity β, (ii) decreases in the retailer’s production efficiency KR,
and (iii) increases in the retailer’s burden φR when φR <
￿
KR/β. If there are no re-
turn flows (i.e., φR = 0, β = 0), we have δ2(q̃∗M) = δ
2(q̃∗
R










how the manufacturer contracts with the retailer with respect to the reverse produc-
tion activities, i.e., the dividing point (φM ,φR) of the reverse production process on
the characteristic curve g(φM). For instance, if the manufacturer burdens the retailer
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more (i.e., higher value for φR) but no more than the threshold value
￿
KR/β, then
return flows become less attractive for the retailer giving more competitive power to
forward flows within the retailer’s production system. This not only shrinks the return




)—both are certainly undesirable
results for the system.
This aspect can be explained by the fact that the retailer makes its decisions in
such a way that forward and return flows of materials are negatively correlated. Recall
that the manufacturer’s goal is to replace a portion of the resource input streams by
return flows in order to reduce production costs. This is equivalent to subtracting the
return volume, γ∗(t), from the retailer’s order amount, q∗
R
(t), and by doing so the two
flows become positively correlated while they are being merged to form the resource
input stream q∗
M
(t). As a result, q∗
M




(t) while exhibiting a smaller time average amount. This is not a favorable situation
for the supplier because it has to operate with a reduced, but more time-varying,
order amount. It is thus possible that such changes in q∗
M
(t) persist over multiple
product cycles so that the system experiences difficulty in establishing stable flows of
raw materials. This implies the need for a supplier capable of flexible production or





This research extends the forward supply chain dynamic model of Eliashberg and
Steinberg (1987) by considering the return flows of materials. The solutions for the
forward channel decisions are analogous, except that the manufacturer orders less
from the supplier because there is a return flow from the market. Our model is
distinguished by the existence of reverse channel decisions that are integrated with
forward channel decisions. This provides new insights for decision-making in a closed-
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loop supply chain where two decision makers, a manufacturer and a retailer, interact
over time. For example, the differential game model tells us the optimal level of ac-
tivity for the retailer in both forward and reverse channels as the market demands
change over time. Such adaptive behavior of the retailer affects the profitability and
the collection rate (i.e., sustainability) of the entire supply chain. Product recov-
ery has higher benefit for products having short life cycles with substantial level of
residual values at the end of life. The model developed in this chapter can be used
to understand the characteristics of optimal decisions in closed-loop supply chains
subject to rapid changes in market demands.
We find that the retailer’s optimal decision is characterized by generating return
flows which are negatively correlated with the forward flows. This property, however,
induces competition between forward and return flows within the retailer’s facility
thereby making the players in the system seek optimal interrelated solutions by bal-
ancing tradeoffs.
The results indicate that the manufacturer and the retailer can pursue profitable
reverse production by appropriately sharing the processing tasks by considering the
characteristic curve g(φM). One of the main advantages is an expansion in market
demands due to a lower wholesale price and a greater return volume. This comple-
ments the advantages of utilizing the retailer’s already established infrastructure in
forward channels as a reverse production channel.
We have shown that a CLSC can accommodate extensive product recovery pro-
cesses when it is easy to obtain postconsumer materials. This shows the potential
opportunity for profitable closed-loop supply chains in some categories of products
even when they require relatively high costs of product recovery.
The approach employed in this research has some limitations even though it pro-
vides insight. For strategic level decisions, the current model does not consider uncer-
tainty. Uncertainty will influence the dynamics of return flows and hence the decision
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making in closed-loop supply chains. The added complexity of modeling uncertainty
makes it difficult to obtain results in the differential game framework, and it is not
clear that specific insights can be established for these cases. A simulation-based
approach may be appropriate for these systems, once reasonable parameter ranges
have been established through deterministic modeling.
Further research We consider several modifications to the present system as ways
to resolve the issue of the competition of materials flows. First of all, a third-party-
collecting system or a manufacturer-collecting system could resolve the issue of the
interference of forward and return flows at the front end of the supply chain system.
However, Savaskan et al. (2004) report that in a decentralized supply chain, in which
all participants pursue their own profit and have sufficient production capacity, the
retailer is most preferred in performing product take-back from the market. Our
approach is mainly distinguished from Savaskan et al. (2004) by considering convex
production costs in a dynamic setting. Hence, comparing the performance of those
different reverse channel structures within our framework would be an interesting
extension. It would be also interesting to see what happens if we include factors
other than net profit, e.g., return volume, in the objective function.
Alternatively, we can separate the retailer’s joint production system into two in-
dependent production systems—one for forward production, and the other for re-
verse production. More specifically, we can use fR(qR)/KR + fR(φRγ)/KR instead
of (qR + φRγ)2/KR as a new production cost model for the retailer. This decouples
the cost of handling forward and return flows, and hence eliminates the competi-
tion within the retailer’s production system. As a result the cost always decreases,
e.g., (qR + φRγ)2/KR > q2R/KR + (φRγ)
2
/KR, which makes the results substantially
different from the model presented in this chapter and out of its scope.
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3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Proof of Proposition III.1
Introducing an adjoint variable λR(·), the retailer’s Hamiltonian is expressed as
HR(IR, pR, qR, sR,λR, t) = JR(IR, pR, qR, sR, t) + λR(qR − d(pR))
= pRd(pR)− pMqR − fR(qR + φRγ)
− hRIR + (sM − sR)γ(sR)
+ λR(qR − d(pR)). (3.16)
The state variable is constrained by a non-negativity condition and the control vari-
ables are bounded (3.5). For simplicity, we shall consider interior solutions. We then
formulate the Lagrangian as follows:
LR = HR + ρRIR (3.17)
where ρR is a Lagrangian multiplier.
Our solution approach is to segment the trajectory of IR into constrained (IR = 0)
and unconstrained (IR > 0) pieces, and join them at each junction point using jump
conditions (Knowles , 1981). Since the firms face increasing demand in the beginning,
we start with an unconstrained subproblem, i.e., IR > 0.
Subproblem 1 (IR > 0). Let us assume IR(t) > 0 for t ∈ [0, tR). By complemen-
tary slackness, we have ρR(t) = 0. The first order necessary conditions are
∂LR/∂pR = a(t)− 2bpR(t) + bλR(t) = 0 (3.18a)
∂LR/∂qR = −f ￿R (qR(t) + βφRsR(t))− pM + λR(t) = 0 (3.18b)
∂LR/∂sR = −βφRf ￿R (qR(t) + βφRsR(t)) + β (sM − sR(t))− βsR(t) = 0. (3.18c)
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The adjoint equation is
λ̇R(t) = −∂LR/∂IR = hR. (3.19)









































Recall that fR(qR) is a strictly increasing convex function. Hence, the interior solution










with opposite signs. This leads to the following observation:
the retailer’s reverse channel effort s∗
R
(t) is negatively correlated with its forward
channel effort p∗
R
(t) as long as it processes forward and return flows of materials
within the same production system.
Note that the stationary point (3.20) is the only one of its kind that satisfies
(3.18) and is the maximum point in the interior of the control space because of the






= −2β2/KR − 2β, all of which, with KR > 0, b > 0, and β > 0, are
negative.
At this point, it remains to characterize the adjoint variable λR in order to obtain




. For this non-binding segment, (3.19) has the solution
λR(t) = hRt+ CR t ≥ 0 (3.21)
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where CR is a constant. In order to determine the value of CR, we solve the next
subproblem where the state constraint is active, and then apply the jump condition
on the adjoint variable λR(t) at t = tR.
Subproblem 2 (IR(·) = 0). For this subproblem, we allow nonzero value for ρR(t).
In accordance with the restricted maximum principle (Knowles , 1981), the main
concern here is to control the system such that IR(t) = 0. The necessary and sufficient
condition is to make the normal vector on the surface of state constraint perpendicular
to the velocity of state trajectory, i.e.,
qR(t)− d(pR(t)) = 0. (3.22)
With the additional constraint (3.22) to the maximization of the Lagrangian
(3.17), it is straightforward to see that the optimal control for this constrained trajec-
tory has the same form (3.20) as is obtained in the previous subproblem. The adjoint
variable λR, however, is different from (3.21). Solving (3.22) for λR(t), we obtain
λR(t) =
a(t) + βφRsM + (KR + βφ2R) pM
b+KR + βφ2R
(3.23)
for t ≥ tR.
We determine the values of CR using the jump condition λR(tR−) = λR(tR+) at
the entry point on the state boundary. Equating (3.21) and (3.23) at time tR, and
solving for CR, we obtain
CR = λR(tR+)− tRhR. (3.24)




































We assume that the retailer wishes to perform production smoothing and has no
concern for inventory storage capacity during high demands times. It can be shown
that demands hit the peak at t = t￿ for which ȧ(t￿) = 0. Solving for t￿ and rearranging
the inequality tR > t￿ we obtain (3.8).
Finally, with IR(t) = 0, t ∈ [tR, T ], the transversality condition λR(T )IR(T ) =
0 is satisfied at the end of this constrained segment. Therefore, two subproblems
characterize the optimal control and trajectory of the retailer’s problem.
3.6.2 Proof of Proposition III.2
We first solve the optimal control problem (3.10), and then the static optimization
problem (3.9). The structure of the manufacturer’s state constrained optimal control
problem is analogous to that of the retailer. For the similar reason, we will break the
optimal control problem into subproblems starting with an unconstrained trajectory.
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Subproblem 1 (IM > 0). Let us assume IM(t) > 0 for t ∈ [0, tM). Using an adjoint
variable λM(·), the manufacturer’s Hamiltonian is given by







− pSqM − fM(qM + φMγ∗)− hMIM
− sMγ∗ + λM(qM + γ∗ − q∗R). (3.26)
Assuming interior solutions, we formulate the Lagrangian as follows:
LM = HM + ρMIM (3.27)
where ρM is a Lagrangian multiplier whose value is zero in this non-binding segment.
The first order condition is
∂LM
∂qM
= −pS − f ￿M(qM) + λM = 0 (3.28)




= hM . (3.29)







(KM(λM(t)− pS)− 2βφMsR(t)) . (3.30)
The second partial derivatives ∂2LM/∂q2M = −2/KM is negative with KM > 0,
so the Lagrangian is concave over the control space. Hence, (3.30) maximizes the
Lagrangian (3.27).
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It remains to determine the adjoint variable λM(·). Integrating (3.29) gives
λM(t) = hM t+ CM t ≥ 0, (3.31)
where CM is a constant to be determined using the jump condition with the next
subproblem.
Subproblem 2 (IM = 0). In this constrained segment, the following equality con-






(t) = 0. (3.32)
We will maximize the Lagrangian (3.27) as before but with the above additional






) from (3.32), and solving for
λM(t) we obtain
λM(t) =
a(t) (KR + βφR (1− φM + φR))
KM (b+KR + βφ2R)
− bpM (KR + βφR (1− φM + φR))
KM (b+KR + βφ2R)
− βsM (KR + b (1− φM + φR)−KRφM)
KM (b+KR + βφ2R)
+ pS, t ≥ tM . (3.33)
By the jump condition, the adjoint variable λM(t) is continuous at the entry point
tM . Equating (3.31) and (3.33) at t = tM gives
CM = λM(tM+)− tMhM .
In order to determine the switching time tM , we solve the following integral equa-
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5δ0 (K ￿R − βφMφR + βφR)
.
Since the retailer accumulates and discharges inventory during its inventory period
[0, tR], the manufacturer would follow a similar pattern of inventory policy during its
inventory period [0, tM ]. One way to make this possible is to have the manufacturer’s






is a straight line and thus we require its slope to be negative in [0, tR] such that the
rate of inventory accumulation changes from positive to negative during this period.
After some algebraic steps we obtain (3.12). Alternatively, we can use the inequality
tR < tM to obtain the same result.
The transversality condition is λM(T )IM(T ) = 0 which is satisfied by the current
solution. This completes the characterization of the optimal control q∗
M
and the
optimal inventory trajectory I∗
M
of the manufacturer.
3.6.3 Proof of Proposition III.3
Static Optimization Assuming an interior solution, we perform the second deriva-
tive test for the existence and uniqueness of a relative maximum. It is an alge-












< 0. Thus, we have a relative maximum. Equating ∂πM/∂pM and
∂πM/∂sM to zero gives the solution.
3.6.4 Other Proofs
3.6.4.1 Proof of Observation III.1
Using the notation of Proposition III.3, it can be shown that ∂p∗
M








/∂pS = k1/k < 0 if
2KR (b+K ￿R)
(1− φM) (b+KR) + bφR
< βφM
for 0 ≤ φM ≤ 1.
3.6.4.2 Proof of Proposition III.5
We first obtain p̃∗
M











is determined by the following
−ā (KR −KRφM − 2KMφR)− pS (2bKMφR + bKRφM + 2bKM + 2KMKR) .
Depending on the sign of KR−KRφM−2KMφR we have two cases. The result follows.
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CHAPTER IV
Risk Aversion and Product Cannibalization in
Closed-Loop Supply Chains
4.1 Introduction
In closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs), manufacturers take back postconsumer
products, recover the residual values through remanufacturing, and resell the prod-
ucts and new products in a market. Since the remanufactured product is generally
sold at a lower price than the new product, there is a widespread belief that the
demand for the remanufactured product is gained at the cost of new product sales.
This is so-called product cannibalization that concerns manufacturers. Manufactur-
ers try to protect new product sales from the cannibalizing effect of remanufactured
products. For instance, Alpha Equipment destroys most trade-in returns, the value
of which exceeds $800 million in total, to prevent potential market cannibalization
(Atasu et al., 2010). Bosch Power Tools introduces remanufactured products only
where the company has less than 50% market share to minimize the impact on the
sales of new products (Ferguson, 2009). The effort to avoid product cannibalization
is largely based on common sense rather than a scientific basis. CLSC research is
still in its infancy with regard to this important problem. The lack of understanding
of product cannibalization has made manufactures reluctant to introduce remanufac-
tured products into the market.
In this chapter, we challenge the common perception about product cannibaliza-
tion by asking the following questions: Is product cannibalization necessarily bad?
105
Is the degree of product cannibalization an appropriate measure for evaluating a
company’s performance? In what situation is product cannibalization more likely?
In order to properly address these questions, we develop a model considering the
following aspects of CLSCs.
• Consumers generally have low valuations for remanufactured products.
• The sales volume of remanufactured products is limited by the amount of col-
lected postconsumer products.
• The collection quantity depends on the buyback price if postconsumer products
are collected through a take-back program.
• There exists a significant level of uncertainty in the quality of postconsumer
products.
The major contribution of this research lies in providing new insights on interre-
lationship among market segmentation characteristics, quality uncertainty in reman-
ufactured products, consumers’ risk averse decision-making, firm’s risk averse pricing
decisions, product cannibalization, and the total profit of the system. Based on
quantitative models, we show that a manufacturer’s profit generally increases with
remanufacturing, but this accompanies product cannibalization. Increasing uncer-
tainty in the quality of a remanufactured product reduces consumers’ willingness to
buy the product. This helps reduce the degree of product cannibalization, but the
company will experience decreased profit. The best case is found when consumers are
highly likely to return their used products. We confirm that the uniform distribution
assumption gives qualitatively similar results to more general distributions, but there
can be substantial differences in the profit that can be generated. In general, a more
refined understanding of the consumer WTP leads to higher profits. In the following
subsections, we discuss key model features.
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4.1.1 Willingness-to-pay (WTP) and willingness-to-accept (WTA)
One of the ways to build a model that explains product cannibalization in CLSCs
is to examine the characteristics of consumers’ decision-making behavior. To this
end, we focus on consumers’ willingness-to-pay for given product prices.
Definition IV.1. Willingness-to-pay (WTP) is the maximum value a buyer is willing
to give away to receive an item.
It is commonly assumed that consumers make purchase decisions based on their
willingness-to-pay. For example, Shioda et al. (2011) determine the optimal prices of
multiple types of products assuming that consumers make a purchase decision based
on their WTPs. In their model, a consumer chooses a product that maximizes his/her
utility and purchases the product if the maximum utility is positive. Here the utility
of a consumer is defined as the surplus from a transaction, i.e., θ − p, where θ is the
consumer’s WTP and p is the product price.
Our model builds on a similar consumer choice mechanism. Consumers have
the option to buy a new product or a remanufactured product. Each consumer
will choose the one that maximizes his/her utility. We hypothesize that product
cannibalization, if it exists, is related to the utility maximizing decision mechanism.
On the one hand, the sales volume of new products will be reduced if consumers find
that remanufactured products offer better utilities. On the other hand, companies
can reach a new consumer segment with the sales of remanufactured products creating
new demands. The results from our model show that the knowledge of consumers’
WTP is a key to quantifying the change in the demand for each product type and
determining optimal product prices.
Paralleling the concept of a buyer’s WTP is a seller’s willingness-to-accept.
Definition IV.2. Willingness-to-accept (WTA) is the minimum value a seller is
willing to accept in exchange of an item.
107
WTA is addressed in Okada (2010). Consumers are sellers in the reverse channel
transactions for trading postconsumer products. The firm offers a buyback reward to
those who return their used products. The concept of WTA is needed to determine
whether or not a consumer will accept a given buyback reward. This will be explained
in §4.2.3.
4.1.2 Uncertainty and risk aversion
Risk aversion as a way to avoid potential future regrets is a natural decision-
making mechanism when decision makers in a CLSC perceive uncertainties and am-
biguities. This is one of examples where uncertainty in return flows complicates the
decision-making in CLSCs. Firms and consumers in CLSCs face critical uncertainties
and ambiguities, e.g., with regard to product quality, which generally results in risk
aversion. For consumers, price and other relevant attributes such as quality are key
factors for deciding whether or not to purchase the products. Consumers are gener-
ally less willing to pay for a product that has uncertain quality. This risk aversion
often becomes a major barrier for the growth of a recycling market. For example, it is
well known that consumers tend to avoid retreaded tires and re-refined motor oil al-
though these are advertised and certified to be safe (Environment Policy Committee,
2005). In the similar manner, establishing stable and financially viable return flows
is impeded by firms’ lower willingness-to-pay for the uncertain residual value of post-
consumer products and consumers’ lower willingness-to-accept that requests a higher
buyback reward (to avoid future regret in case what they returned turns out to have
a higher value than the buyback reward). As such, understanding the influence of
uncertainty on risk averse decision-making is fundamental for understanding product
cannibalization and thus promoting the growth of CLSCs and associated markets.
Figure 4.1 shows the perceived value of an item for a risk averse customer and a
risk averse seller when they see uncertainty in the quality. In the literature (Okada,
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2010), risk aversion is characterized by a concave curve. For convenience, we represent
the seller’s utility profile as a convex curve as shown in Figure 4.1(b) by interpreting
the vertical axis as the amount of item value transferred to the customer.














Figure 4.1: WTP vs. WTA (Okada, 2010)
In Figure 4.1(a), the horizontal axis represents the quality level of a product.
When there is no uncertainty in the product quality, the customer recognizes the
quality as ξ0 and will purchase the product as long as he/she pays a price, say p0, that
is lower than vC(ξ0). In this way, the customer obtains a positive surplus vC(ξ0)− p0.
Suppose that the customer is not sure about the product quality such that he/she
is only able to guess that the quality would belong to a range [ξ0 − L, ξ0 + L]. In
this case, the average utility becomes vC(ξ￿) that is lower than vC(ξ0) due to the risk
aversion represented by the concavity of the utility curve. With a decrease in the
customer’s WTP from vC(ξ0) to vC(ξ￿), the seller may need to offer a price, say p￿,
that is lower than p0 in order to sell the item.
Assuming that both parties share a common belief about the quality level ξ0,
the seller knows that an item value vS(ξ0) is transferred to the customer when there
is no uncertainty in the quality. Thus, the seller will sell the item as long as it
receives a reward, p0, higher than vS(ξ0) in order to obtain a positive surplus p0 −
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vS(ξ0). However, when there exists uncertainty in product quality, the seller’s WTA
is adjusted such that the least acceptable reward is increased from vS(ξ0) to vS(ξ￿￿)
due to the risk aversion. This may require a reward, p￿, higher than p0 for the item
to be sold.
In summary, an item is traded if
vS(ξ0) < p0 < vC(ξ0) (4.1)
when there exists no perceived uncertainty in the item value. If both of them do not
know for sure the quality of an item, the item price, p￿, must satisfy
vS(ξ
￿￿) < p￿ < vC(ξ
￿) (4.2)
for a transaction to be established. Note that p￿ has a narrower range than p0, i.e.,
vS(ξ0) < vS(ξ￿￿) < p￿ < vC(ξ￿) < vC(ξ0). Also, as the degree of risk aversion increases
(i.e., the customer’s and the seller’s utility curves become more concave and more
convex, respectively), vC(ξ￿) decreases and vS(ξ￿￿) increases. This gives a smaller
range for p￿.
4.1.3 Related literature
In the field of traditional forward supply chains, Moorthy and Png (1992) inves-
tigate a market segmentation and product cannibalization problem to show that a
seller may face product cannibalization with a possible profit decrease if low-end and
high-end products are simultaneously introduced into a market. Although their con-
sumer choice mechanism is similar to that in our model, the result may not be directly
applicable to the case of CLSCs. This is because product cannibalization in CLSCs
is an outcome of complex interactions between forward and reverse material flows,
unlike that in traditional forward supply chains.
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Quantitative models that address product cannibalization in CLSCs, however,
have been rare. Atasu et al. (2008) study a remanufacturing strategy for a segmented
market, where there exist “primary” consumers who have low valuation for a re-
manufactured product and “green” consumers who value new and remanufactured
products the same. Consumers’ WTP is assumed to be uniformly distributed. The
size of the green market segment and primary consumers’ low evaluation are iden-
tified as the main drivers for product cannibalization. From the perspective of our
modeling approach, a consumer in the green market segment is not risk averse. Con-
trary to this, the market segmentation in our model is continuous in the sense that
every consumer is risk averse and can belong to any market segmentation. It is each
consumer’s WTP and quality perception that determine the purchase decision and
the associated market segment.
Ferguson and Toktay (2006) find conditions under which remanufacturing is prof-
itable for OEMs. Further, they show that allowing the remanufacturing of a third-
party competitor may adversely impact the OEM’s profit performance. Majumder
and Groenevelt (2001) report a similar result for a competition between an OEM and
a remanufacturer. The results from our model support the conclusions of Majumder
and Groenevelt (2001).
Mitra (2007) addresses a revenue management problem in a CLSC using a linear
price-demand model, which is effectively equivalent to assuming a uniformWTP. Debo
et al. (2005) study product remanufacturability problems using a simple hypothetical
non-uniform WTP distribution. We argue that a uniform distribution of WTP is
unlikely in real situations. It is not even obvious whether a WTP distribution would
be unimodal or multimodal. While pricing decisions require the knowledge of the
market, previous research in CLSCs has mainly focused on operational problems,
with simple assumptions for market characteristics, primarily to obtain analytical
solutions, e.g., “A common assumption used in almost all models is that consumers
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are uniformly distributed in their willingness-to-pay for a product between 0 and
1 (Ferguson, 2009).” Our research extends this stream of research by employing
general WTP distributions such as normal distributions and Gaussian mixtures in
price optimization in CLSCs. One of the objectives in this chapter is to experiment
with various WTP distributions and compare the results to the uniform WTP case.
Recently, Ovchinnikov (2011) has addressed an optimal remanufacturing strategy
considering product cannibalization. His model is based on the observation that
consumers often infer quality from price, i.e., a very low price may signal inferior
quality. The author tries to explain consumers’ switching from new to remanufactured
products by an inverted U-shape curve and compares this approach to a WTP-based
pricing model, where consumers always prefer a cheaper price. As this is the most
related paper to our research, we summarize the difference between our model and
Ovchinnikov (2011) in Table 4.1.
As noted in the literature (Voelckner , 2006), the actual shape of a WTP distri-
bution is crucial for determining optimal prices and estimating demands for new and
remanufactured products. For example, when a market contains two distinct clus-
ters of high valuation and low valuation consumer segments, a moderate price change
may not convert some of the high valuation consumers to low valuation consumers, or
vice-versa, which the inverted-U shape model may not explain. Our results show that
optimal prices and demands change significantly when there exist distinct clusters of
consumer segments.
In the marketing literature, estimating consumers’ WTP has been an important
issue for determining optimal prices and developing new products. Breidert et al.
(2006) provide a good review of various methods for estimating consumers’ WTP. In
order to better focus on our research topic, we assume that information of consumers’
WTP is given.
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Table 4.1: A comparison of two models that address product cannibalization in CLSC.
Ovchinnikov (2011) Our model
profit margins the new product is assumed
to have a higher profit margin
than the remanufactured prod-
uct
profit margins for new and re-
manufactured products are de-
termined by optimal prices
product can-
nibalization
product cannibalization is ex-
plicitly modeled in the objec-
tive function
product cannibalization may
or may not occur depending on










in both forward and reverse
production activities: new
product price, remanufactured




based on the inverted U-shape
curve
based on product prices and
quality perceptions
demand deterministic deterministic
solution analytical solution numerical solution
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4.2 Monopoly
In this section, we develop a model for determining optimal prices when con-
sumers are risk averse in purchasing remanufactured product and reselling their used
products. We first consider a firm that monopolizes the market with its new and
remanufactured products, and then extend it to a duopoly case in §4.3 where the
firm and an external remanufacturer compete with each other.
4.2.1 The model
We consider a case where remanufactured products are made from recovering
used products collected from the market through product take-back activities. In the
market, consumers are risk averse and the degree of risk aversion is influenced by
the amount of uncertainty they perceive in the quality of a given product. In what
follows, we use the notations explained in Table 4.2.
4.2.2 WTP and WTA in forward material flows
Consider a firm that sells new and remanufactured products. Consumers are
assumed to be sensitive to price and quality of the products. The firm wishes to
determine: pn = price of a new product, pr = price of a remanufactured product, and
b = buyback price of a used product. The primary source of uncertainty is the quality
of remanufactured products. This is due to variation in consumers’ usage patterns.
Compared to this, the relative level of uncertainty in new products is negligible. To
better focus on investigating the influence of uncertainty in the return flows, we make
the following assumption.
Assumption IV.1. There is no uncertainty in the quality of new products. However,
consumers perceive uncertainty in remanufactured products.




pn price of new product (decision variable)
pr price of remanufactured product (decision variable)
b buyback price (decision variable)
cn unit manufacturing cost
cr unit remanufacturing cost
ps unit purchase cost of raw material
θ consumer’s WTP for a new product
θmax consumer’s maximum WTP for a new product
vC(ξ) consumers’ degree of risk aversion about buying a remanufactured product
vS(ξ) firm’s WTA in the transaction of remanufactured products
ξ quality level of remanufactured product
δ consumer’s discount factor for future resale value of a purchased item
fθ(·) distribution of consumers’ WTP for a new product
φ consumer’s WTA for buyback price for returning a new product
φmax maximum WTA for buyback price in the market
wC(ζ) consumers’ degree of risk aversion for accepting a buyback price
wS(ζ) firm’s degree of risk aversion about buying used products
ζ quality level of used product
η yield rate of remanufacturing process
fφ(·) distribution of consumers’ WTA for buyback price
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the transaction of a new product become linear because they are not risk-averse.
However, we consider risk aversion in the transactions of remanufactured products,
assuming appropriate shapes of utility curves for the decision makers.
Assumption IV.2. A risk averse buyer’s utility curve is concave in the quality of
products. The utility in this case represents the value received. A risk averse seller’s
utility curve is convex in the quality of products. In this case, the utility represents
the value transferred to the buyer.
With the above assumption, the risk averse seller wishes to quote a price pr that
is higher than vS(ξ￿￿):
pr ≥ vS(ξ￿￿), (4.3)
where ξ￿￿ is the perceived quality level for the remanufactured product.
As for selling remanufactured products, the degree of risk aversion of the seller
would be much lower than that of buyers for the reason that the remanufacturing of
used products is supposed to meet a certain quality level. In other words, the firm sells
remanufactured products only when it is certain about the product quality. Therefore,
we can assume that the seller sees no uncertainty in the quality of remanufactured
products, i.e., ξ0 = ξ￿￿. Let cr denote the unit remanufacturing cost. The seller invests
b+cr to produce a remanufactured product. This is the minimum WTA for the seller.
Thus, we simplify (4.3) as
pr ≥ b+ cr = vS(ξ0). (4.4)
It is reasonable to assume that the degree of risk aversion in a market would be
influenced by the type of product. For example, consumers tend to be more risk averse
about used tires than used vehicles, i.e., the used tire market is perceived riskier by
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consumers than the used vehicle market. We will consider average risk aversion in
a market. Average risk aversion is addressed in, for example, Spence (1977), Athey
(2002), and Duch (2010). Let vC(ξ￿) denote consumers’ average risk aversion for
remanufactured products, where ξ￿ is the perceived quality level. Without loss of
generality, we assume that the value of vC(ξ￿) is normalized such that vC(ξ￿) ∈ [0, 1]
for ξ￿ ∈ [0, 1]. When vC(ξ￿) = 1, consumers value the new and remanufactured
products the same. Maximum risk aversion occurs with vC(ξ￿) = 0 when consumers’
quality perception for a remanufactured product is zero. Any value between 0 and 1
for vC(ξ￿) indicates an intermediate case. Although we assume the same risk aversion
characteristics for the entire consumer group, each individual may have a different
utility level for a given product quality. Consider a consumer whose WTP for a new
product is θ. We can then scale vC(ξ￿) by θ and define θvC(ξ￿) as the WTP of the
consumer for a remanufactured product with a quality level ξ￿. Note that the relation
θvC(ξ￿) ≤ θ holds to imply that WTP for a remanufactured product will not be higher
than that for a new product.
We assume that the firm collects used products at a unit price b regardless of
whether the collected products were previously sold as new products or as reman-
ufactured products. Consumers use their purchased products for one time period,
and have an option to resell their used products to the firm. Consumers take this
into account in their purchase decision by giving a weight factor δ to the future resale
value of their used products. A higher value for δ implies that consumers highly value
the future resale value δb. A lower value for δ represents the case where the future
resale value of the used product is not an important decision factor in the purchase
decision. As such, consumers can use a future resale value as a discount factor for
a product price. Considering this, we derive formulae for describing a consumer’s
choice between a new and a remanufactured products with risk aversion. A consumer
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with a WTP θ will purchase a new product if
θ − pn + δb ≥ θvC(ξ￿)− pr + δb (4.5a)
θ − pn + δb ≥ 0 (4.5b)
and will purchase a remanufactured product if
θvC(ξ
￿)− pr + δb ≥ θ − pn + δb (4.6a)
θvC(ξ
￿)− pr + δb ≥ 0. (4.6b)
The left-hand-side and right-hand-side of (4.5a) are the utilities the consumer obtains
from buying a new product and a remanufactured product, respectively. In addition
to this, (4.5b) ensures that the utility from buying a new product is nonnegative. The
purchase conditions (4.6a) and (4.6b) for a remanufactured product are constructed
in the similar manner.





, pn − δb
￿
(4.7)
or, from (4.6), buy a remanufactured product if
pr − δb
vC(ξ￿)
≤ θ < pn − pr
1− vC(ξ￿)
(4.8)





The minimumWTP for buying a new item expressed by (4.7) is a maximum of two
quantities. The first term (pn − pr)/(1− vC(ξ￿)) can be interpreted as an additional
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investment, pn−pr, for buying a new item, which is adjusted by the uncertainty effect
1/(1− vC(ξ￿)). The second term, pn − δb, is the new product price perceived by the
consumer. This result is intuitive because a consumer will buy a new item if he/she is
willing to either (i) pay an additional amount that is needed to buy a new item or (ii)
pay a higher amount than the perceived price for a new item. By (4.8), the WTP of
those who buy a remanufactured item is bounded from below by the perceived price
pr − δb, which is adjusted by the uncertainty effect vC(ξ￿), and the WTP will not be
higher than the uncertainty-adjusted additional amount (pn−pr)/(1−vC(ξ￿)) needed
for buying a new item.
As pr becomes closer to pn, more consumers will choose the new product because
of the decreased price gap between the two types of products. In an extreme case
where pr = pn, remanufactured and new products are equivalent and any incremental
price difference will cause the market to shift dramatically.
Next, we characterize the upper bound for pr for which demands for remanufac-
tured products exist.
Proposition IV.1. There exists a demand for the remanufactured product if the
following inequality holds:
pr < vC(ξ
￿)pn + (1− vC(ξ￿))δb. (4.10)
Proof. The upper bound for pr is easily obtained from (4.8). We need the following







The result follows from rearranging the above inequality. Note that the right hand
side of (4.10) is a convex combination of two prices pn and δb, where δb < pn. Thus,












Figure 4.2: Distribution of consumers’ WTP (θ) for buying a remanufactured prod-
uct.
(4.8) will be positive and there exist nonnegative values for θ that satisfy (4.8).
The lower bound (4.7) for WTP of those who buy new products implies that
there could exist a group of consumers who are willing to pay the amount (pn −
pr)/(1− vC(ξ￿)), but no more than the perceived price pn − δb, i.e., pn − δb > (pn −
pr)/(1 − vC(ξ￿)), or equivalently, pr > vC(ξ￿)pn + (1 − vC(ξ￿))δb. In other words,
there could exist consumers who think the new product offers a better value than the
remanufactured one, but do not buy anything because their WTP is not high enough
to buy the new product. Proposition IV.1 shows that this does not happen when
there exists a demand for the remanufactured product.
Note that θ is a unique characteristics of an individual consumer in the market.
This implies that we can assume a distribution of θ as illustrated in Figure 4.2. The
illustration is a generalized version of the uniformly distributed WTP discussed in
Ferguson (2009). For a normalized market with total population size 1, the distribu-
tion denoted by fθ represents consumers’ WTP characteristics of the market. In the
literature, the assumption of a uniform distribution for θ is common. We hypothe-
size that it will be more likely that the distribution is left-skewed, right-skewed, or
symmetric in real situations depending on the degree of risk aversion, market segmen-
tations, and the type of products. Further, there could be multiple peaks in WTP
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distribution in a clustered market. Our model can address such various cases by using
an appropriate distribution function fθ to fit a given situation.
The area under the function fθ represents the amount of demand for new products
(Dn), demand for remanufactured products (Dr), and the number of no purchases
(D0). The boundary between two regions D0 and Dr, denoted by θ1, is determined by
the perceived price level for the remanufactured product. Consumers with a higher
WTP than this will purchase the remanufactured product. On the other hand, the
boundary between Dr and Dn, denoted by θ2, is determined not by the price level for
the new product, but by the price difference between the new and the remanufactured
products. This implies that those who consider buying the remanufactured product
will switch to the new product if they can afford the additional amount that is needed
for buying the new product. As the uncertainty in product quality increases, the
degree of risk aversion of consumers increases and consumers become less willing to
pay for a remanufactured product, i.e., the value of vC(ξ￿) decreases. This leads to
higher demands for new products, lower demands for remanufactured products, and a
higher number of no purchases. The opposite happens when there is less uncertainty
in product quality.
The value of θ1 determines the amount of total demand, and the value of θ2
determines the level of product cannibalization of new product by remanufactured
product. An increase in θ2 indicates that demand for new product is cannibalized by
demand for remanufactured product. As such, it would be interesting to see when the
firm can create new demands while minimizing product cannibalization, i.e., decreases
in θ1 and θ2. We address this question via numerical experiments.
4.2.3 WTP and WTA in reverse material flows
The decision makers’ roles change in the reverse channel, i.e., the firm is the buyer
and consumers are sellers. But it is the firm who still determines the price for the
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transaction. Let ζ, 0 ≤ ζ ≤ 1, denote the quality of a used product. Consider a
consumer who transfers utility φ to the buyer when the quality of the traded product
is as new, i.e., ζ = 1. Let φwC(ζ) denote the utility the customer transfers to the
buyer when the quality level of the used product is less than new. Similar to Figure
4.1(b), wC(ζ) is convex in ζ and wC(ζ) ∈ [0, 1]. The value of the transferred product
will be recognized as φwC(ζ0) if the quality level ζ0 of the used product is perceived
with certainty. With uncertainty, it becomes φwC(ζ ￿) which is higher than φwC(ζ0)
due to the risk aversion of the consumer. Note that it is the consumer who ‘sells’ items
(i.e., used products) in the reverse channel. Thus, we assume the same risk aversion
mechanism that we applied to the firm in the forward channel. This is depicted by
Figure 4.1(b). Intuitively, sellers will quote a higher price when they see uncertainty,
whether they are engaged in forward or reverse transactions.
The consumer requests a higher buyback price b with an increase in quality un-
certainty of the used product. In order to collect the consumer’s used product, the
firm has to offer a buyback price that satisfies b ≥ φwC(ζ ￿). This condition specifies




This implies that consumers with a WTA less than b/wC(ζ ￿) will return their used
product. The more uncertain consumers are about the quality of remanufactured
products, i.e., a higher value for wC(ζ ￿), a smaller number of them will return their
used products. We assume a nonuniform distribution for φ as we did for θ (Figure
4.3). The amount of collected used products can be computed by integrating fφ(·)
up to b/wC(ζ ￿). When the uncertainty in the return flows increases, wC(ζ ￿) increases,
and thus the return volume decreases.







Figure 4.3: Distribution of consumers’ WTA (φ) for a buyback price
by the firm. This is a concave function in ζ ￿￿, 0 ≤ ζ ￿￿ ≤ 1, such that wS(ζ ￿￿) ∈ [0, 1].
The maximum quality level wS(ζ ￿￿)ps is ps when ζ ￿￿ = 1, which is equivalent to buying
a new material at price ps. Uncertainty in the quality of a used product reduces the
firm’s WTP, i.e., wS(ζ ￿￿) ≤ wS(ζ0). Thus, the buyback price will be determined at a
lower level when there exists uncertainty in the quality of collected products, i.e.,
b ≤ wS(ζ ￿￿)ps. (4.12)
Combining (4.4) and (4.12), we obtain b ≤ min{pr − cr, wS(ζ ￿￿)ps}. The firm has an
incentive to collect used product only if this condition is satisfied. This upper bound
for b is influenced by the uncertainty in the quality of used products and the degree
of risk aversion of the firm. For example, a higher uncertainty in product quality,
thus a lower value for wS(ζ ￿￿), may decrease the upper bound for b. Note that it
is in the firm’s best interest to offer as small a buyback price b as possible, which
is just sufficient to induce consumers to return their used products. Any higher
buyback price would only incur unnecessary costs. Therefore, we expect that the
upper bound (4.12) will not be tight for an optimal buyback price b. This implies
that the knowledge of the respective distributions of WTP (in forward channel) and
WTA (in reverse channel) of consumers is more critical than that of the firm’s.
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4.2.4 Determination of optimal prices: pn, pr, and b
We are now ready to formulate a model that can be used to determine optimal
prices for new, remanufactured, and used products considering quality uncertainties
and consumers’ WTP, θ with distribution fθ(·), and WTA, φ with distribution fφ(·).
The firm’s objective is to maximize the profit function Π(pn, pr, b):

























φmin ≤ b ≤ min{pr − cr, wS(ζ ￿￿)ps} (4.14b)
pr < vC(ξ
￿)pn + (1− vC(ξ￿))δb (4.14c)
pn < θmax (4.14d)
In (4.13), the first term is the profit from selling new products, the second term is the
profit from selling remanufactured products, and the third term is the cost of acquiring
used products. The constraint (4.14a) limits the total number of remanufactured
products by a fraction η of total return volume, where η is the yield rate of product
recovery. The constraint on the buyback price (4.14b) comes from (4.4) and (4.12).
By Proposition IV.1, there will be no return flow if (4.14c) is violated. In this case,
the problem reduces to that of non-remanufacturing case, which we call the open-
loop system. Finally, the maximum possible price for the new product is limited by
consumer’s maximum WTP (4.14d).
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In §4.1.2, we discussed a range for an item price when decision makers are risk
averse. The buyer’s risk aversion determines an upper bound and the seller’s risk
aversion determines a lower bound for the item price. As for the buyback price
b, the lower bound is given by (4.11) and the upper bound by (4.12). As for the
remanufactured product price pr, the lower and upper bounds are obtained from (4.9)
and (4.10), respectively. It is easy to see that these are addressed in the constraints
set (4.14). As such, the feasible region formed by (4.14) becomes smaller when the
decision makers increase their risk aversion.
The model is highly nonlinear and an analytical solution is intractable. We solve
the model numerically using the variable neighborhood search method (Mladenovic
and Hansen, 1997).
4.2.5 Numerical experiments
We perform extensive numerical experiments on the model detailed by (4.13)
and (4.14) to obtain useful insights about profitable product remanufacturing when
consumers are risk averse in the presence of uncertainty. To this end, we define the
parameter values as follows. Without loss of generality, we set θmin = 0 and θmax = 10.
This defines the support of the distribution of WTP as [0, 10]. The optimal prices
pn, pr, and b will take values in [0, 10].1 Similarly, we assign 0 to φmin and 10 to
φmax. Our primary interest lies in understanding the influence of the degree of risk
aversion of consumers. Thus, we use a wide range of values for vC(ξ￿) and wC(ζ ￿).
We also set δ = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9 in order to investigate the influence of consumers’
weight factor for future resale value. With a higher value for δ, consumers are more
interested in the future resale value of their used product and consider this in their
purchase decisions. We set the values of the other parameters at reasonable values as
shown in Table 4.3.
1
For any given value to θmax, the values of the other parameters and decision variables can be
appropriately scaled.
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vC(ξ￿) 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9
wC(ζ ￿) 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5
δ 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9
wS(ζ ￿￿) 0.8
Different market characteristics are modeled by four different types of WTP dis-
tributions fθ(·) as shown in Table 4.4. We use Gaussian mixture models to account
for two different clusters of consumers, i.e., low valuation and high valuation con-
sumers. A Gaussian mixture model is flexible in the sense that it can fit a wide range
of distributions. It is one of methods for representing market segmentations (Huang
et al., 2007). We assume a normal distribution fφ(·) with regard to consumers’ WTA
for buyback price as there will exist only one category of product, i.e., used products.
There are a total of 36,000 cases.
Table 4.4: Distributions examined for WTP and WTA. Three cases of different stan-
dard deviation, σ = 0.7, 1.0, and 1.3, apply to all except the uniform
distribution. All distributions are truncated on the finite support.
Distributions Types
fθ(·) Normal (µ = 6, 7, 8)
Gaussian mixture (µ1 = 4, µ2 = 7, 30% of population at mode 1)
Gaussian mixture (µ1 = 4, µ2 = 7, 70% of population at mode 1)
Uniform ∼ [θmin, θmax]
fφ(·) Normal (µ = 1, 2, 3)
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We implemented the variable neighborhood search method in C programming
language to solve the model. The total required computation time for all 36,000 cases
was 20 minutes on a quad-core 2.4 GHz PC. In the next section, we discuss averaged
solution results for the four different WTP distributions followed by a comparison of
the four different cases.
4.2.5.1 The influence of consumers’ risk aversion in buying remanufac-
tured product
The solutions obtained for the numerical experiments provide insights that are
consistent with intuition. Some of the numerical results are shown in Figure 4.4.
Consider the degree of risk aversion of consumers, which can be expressed by 1−
vC(ξ￿), in their purchase of remanufactured products. The value of 1−vC(ξ￿) increases
as consumers become more risk averse. Demand for remanufactured products is
directly influenced by consumers’ risk averse decision-making. As consumers are less
certain about the quality of remanufactured products, more consumers switch to
buying a new product as shown by the decreasing θ2 in Figure 4.4(a). Also, when
this happens the value of θ1 slightly increases, which implies that more consumers
will choose to not buy anything when they see more uncertainty in remanufactured
products. Thus, the gain in total demand decreases (Figure 4.4(e)).
Intuitively, the firm will have to decrease the price of remanufactured product as
consumers become more reluctant to buy remanufactured products (Figure 4.4(b)).
As a result, the firm has a reduced unit profit for each sale of remanufactured products
(Figure 4.4(c)). However, the unit profit from new products is less influenced by
consumers’ risk aversion on remanufactured products except the case where consumers
show very low risk aversion. In this case, most of the demand for new product is
cannibalized by that of remanufactured product. The optimal solution implies that
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system
Figure 4.4: The influence of consumers’ risk aversion in buying remanufactured prod-
uct.
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Figure 4.4(d) shows that buyback price decreases as consumers are more risk
averse to buying remanufactured products. This occurs because the firm will have
less incentive for collecting used products when demand for the remanufactured prod-
uct rapidly decreases. In summary, a larger portion of consumers switch to the new
product as consumers become more risk averse to purchasing a remanufactured prod-
uct. As a result, the firm’s profit decreases.
4.2.5.2 The influence of consumers’ risk aversion in accepting the buy-
back price
In the reverse channel, consumers are risk averse in their decisions to accept a
buyback reward for returning their used products. That is, they may request a higher
reward when there exists uncertainty in the quality of used products. This is to avoid
any potential future regret for returning a used product that is worth more than the
accepted buyback price. The value of wC(ζ ￿) represents the degree of risk aversion
in accepting a given buyback price. The buyback price also affects the transaction
in the forward channel through a discounting effect on prices because consumers
can anticipate a future money back reward. This discounting effect varies from one
product category to another. For example, many consumers take into account the
future resale value when they consider buying a car. But it is unlikely that they will
also consider the future resale value of new tires. This is addressed via different values
for δ in our model.
In Figure 4.5, we compare two cases when δ = 0.1 and δ = 0.9. Let us first
consider the case where consumers give a small weight factor, δ = 0.1, to the future
resale value of used products. From Figure 4.2 we know that θ1 increases with a
smaller value of δ, which implies that more consumers choose to not buy anything
and the total demand decreases. The firm needs to offer a higher buyback price when
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Figure 4.5: The influence of consumers’ risk aversion in accepting a buyback price
(dotted line for δ = 0.1, solid line for δ = 0.9).
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as shown in Figure 4.5(d). The same argument applies to the case of δ = 0.9.
Any increase in b would enlarge the total demand by decreasing the value of θ1.
However, this change in buyback price does not contribute much to the change in
the value of θ1 because the value of the scale factor δ is small. With an increase in
buyback price the firm has a tighter profit margin in reverse channel transactions.
Thus, the price of remanufactured product pr increases. As opposed to this, pn is
decreasing as a function of consumers’ risk aversion because the firm expands the
demand for new products and as a result it has more room to adjust the price of new
products. Accordingly, the uncertainty in reverse channel reduces the price difference
pn − pr and the value of θ2. This drives more people to prefer new products over
remanufactured products. The firm has little incentive for increasing return flows by
offering a higher buyback price, as the demand for remanufactured product will be
small. Nevertheless, the firm has to increase the buyback price in order to acquire
return flow from consumers who are reluctant to return their used products. In all,
Figure 4.5(c) shows that the unit profit for each of the new and remanufactured
products decreases with increasing consumers’ risk aversion in the reverse channel.
Next, we consider the case δ = 0.9. Examples here include cases where products
are leased to customers for a finite period of time. In this case, the price of leasing
an item is equivalent to pn − δb in our model. The firm still has to increase the
buyback price when δ is larger and consumers become more risk averse in reverse
channel transactions. However, unlike the previous case for δ = 0.1, the increase
in buyback price is amplified by the larger scale factor δ = 0.9. When the value of
δ is large, an increase in the buyback price strengthens the consumers’ interest in
the remanufactured product. As a result, the value of θ1 slightly decreases (Figure
4.5(a)) and the firm can increase total demand and profit when the uncertainty in
the reverse channel becomes larger. This result shows that active participation of
consumers is important for viable operation of the closed-loop supply chain. It may
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be intuitively obvious that less uncertainty in any part of the system is more desirable
for improving the system performance. Interestingly, some types of uncertainty could
stimulate decision makers in such a way that their decisions drive a better system
performance under specific situations. When consumers are very willing to return
their used products, the adverse effect of uncertainty in the reverse channel can be
overcome.
4.2.5.3 The influence of consumers’ weight factor for future resale value
We further explore the importance of the value of δ for profitable remanufacturing.
As consumers give a higher weight factor for future resale value of their used products,
the firm can create new demands with a decrease in the value of θ1. This requires
more return flows from the market. Thus, the firm needs to increase the buyback price
as shown in Figure 4.6(d). This is desirable for the firm as it reinforces the decrease
in the value of θ1 creating more new demand (Figure 4.6(a)). Increasing demand
for the remanufactured product also cannibalizes the new product sales. Overall, as
consumers are more willing to return their used products, the firm’s profit increases
almost linearly.
4.2.5.4 Comparison of various WTP distributions
We have thus far discussed common qualitative characteristics of four different
WTP distributions defined in Table 4.4. The results imply that the assumption
of uniformly distributed WTP is suitable for explaining overall qualitative changes
in optimal prices, profit, and demand with regard to the changes in the degree of
consumers’ risk aversion in forward and reverse channels. This shows the usefulness
of the uniform WTP distribution as an analytical tool for driving qualitative insights
and intuition. However, the profit/demand gains and the optimal prices can be
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(b) Average optimal prices. (pn.o = price of new product in open-loop
system)
Figure 4.7: Profit/demand gains and optimal prices for the four distributions defined
in Table 4.4.
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We compare four different WTP distributions in Figure 4.7. In bimodal (0.3) and
bimodal (0.7) distributions, 30% and 70% of the population belong to the cluster with
mean value at 4, respectively. Figure 4.7(a) shows that the relative profit and demand
gain from remanufacturing (when compared to the open-loop case) is the highest in
bimodal (0.7) case. In particular, the demand gain in bimodal (0.7) significantly
outperforms all the other cases. This is reasonable given that in bimodal (0.7) market,
remanufacturing can capture the demand from the large low valuation consumer
cluster, which the open-loop system cannot reach unless it significantly decreases the
new product price.
Optimal prices in different markets are compared in Figure 4.7(b). One can ob-
serve that the uniform WTP produces the highest optimal price for a new product
whether or not the firm is engaged in remanufacturing. This is because the uni-
form WTP distribution overestimates the number of the high valuation consumers.
Note that, according to Table 4.4, the mean of the uniform WTP distribution is
(θmax − θmin)/2 = (θmax − 0)/2 = θmax/2 = 10/2 = 5. The mean values of the other
distributions are higher than 5. It might seem logical to expect a low optimal price
for a WTP distribution that has a lower mean level. The numerical result shows an
opposite result in Figure 4.7(b) where the uniform WTP distribution produces the
highest optimal prices. This can be explained by the shape of the uniform distribution
that ‘overestimates’ the number of high-valuation consumers.
4.2.5.5 Product cannibalization
Remanufacturing brings a profit increase to each of the four different cases. But
it also accompanies product cannibalization. Figure 4.8 shows that about 30% of the
demand for a new product switches to a remanufactured product in the numerical
experiments. It is generally recognized that product cannibalization is an undesirable
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Figure 4.8: Product cannibalization (fractional decrease in new product sales)
product cannibalization is inevitable if firms wish to pursue a higher profit from
remanufacturing. In fact, the issue of product cannibalization should be approached
from a broader perspective, i.e., the total profit of the system.
One of the contributions of this research is that we quantify profit gains and
product cannibalization considering characteristic distributions of consumers’ WTP.
Our model consistently demonstrates that any profit gain from remanufacturing is
accompanied by product cannibalization of new product by remanufactured product
but that this does not necessarily decrease overall profit. We argue that this result
must be understood within the context of revenue management, i.e., firms can increase
their profits by offering several different category of products with different value
propositions to customers who have different levels of WTP. In this way, firms can
reach different market segments and achieve better profits by adapting their systems
to the specific market conditions.
4.2.5.6 What if a uniform WTP approximation is wrong?
As we mentioned earlier in this chapter, a uniform assumption for a distribution
of consumers’ WTP has been widely accepted in the related research field. However,
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there may be cases where the uniform assumption of WTP fails to capture important
market characteristics. We ask the following questions: “What would be the quality
of a solution in terms of profit performance when we approximate a real WTP dis-
tribution with a uniform distribution?” In other words, “What if a uniform WTP
approximation is wrong?” Our model is useful to answer this question as the model
can accommodate general distributions for WTP. To this end, we assume that nor-
mal, bimodal (0.3), and bimodal (0.7) WTP distributions represent real situations.
There are 36,000 cases in each of three different types of WTP distributions. We
then approximate each real WTP distribution with a uniform WTP distribution to
obtain optimal prices, pn, pr, and b, that maximize the profit. For a given ‘real’ WTP
distribution:
1. The true optimal profit, say Π∗, is obtained using the real WTP distribution.
2. The approximate profit, say Π̃, is obtained using a uniform WTP distribution.
The ratio Π̃/Π∗ is then defined as the solution quality of a uniform WTP approx-
imation for the given real WTP distribution. From this numerical experiment, we
identify two issues with the uniform WTP approximation.
First, we find that only 52%, 30%, and 62% of 36,000 approximate solutions are
feasible for normal, bimodal (0.3), and bimodal (0.7) cases, respectively. In fact, a
uniform approximation does not guarantee a solution that is also feasible in a “real”
situation. This is because the feasible region defined by (4.14) depends on the WTP
distribution fθ(·). Thus, a solution obtained from a uniformly approximated WTP
distribution may not be directly implemented in a real market due to the feasibility
issues.
Second, Figure 4.9 shows the average solution quality in the feasible cases. The
uniform WTP approximation works best for the bimodal (0.3) case. It achieves 80%
of optimality. In this case, the uniform distribution’s overestimation of the high














Figure 4.9: Average of solution quality, Π̃/Π∗, of uniform WTP approximations. (Π̃
= approximated profit via uniform WTP, Π∗ = optimal profit)
bution, it achieves only 60% of optimality. Note that the uniform WTP distribution
has its mean value at θ = 5. Among the three types of ‘real’ WTP distributions, the
bimodal (0.7) distribution has the smallest mean value that is closer to 5 due to its
large low valuation consumer cluster centered at θ = 4. Yet the solution quality for
this case is outperformed by the bimodal (0.3) distribution which has a higher mean
level with a large high valuation consumer cluster centered at θ = 7. The implication
is that approximating a real WTP distribution with a uniform distribution that has
the same or similar mean value is not sufficient for obtaining a high quality solution.
Overall, the numerical result implies that companies may underperform with the
uniformly approximated solution in a real market even when there exists a large high
valuation consumer cluster. From the perspective of financial viability of CLSCs, it is
an important issue because the profit underperformance caused by suboptimal prices
may signal wrong impressions that product remanufacturing is not profitable enough
when they can greatly improve the profit performance by incorporating correct market
information into the price optimization process. In summary, the results demonstrate
that knowledge of specific market characteristics, i.e., the distribution of consumers’
WTP, is critical for determining optimal prices and the resulting profit performance
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for product remanufacturing operations.
4.3 Duopoly
There are many cases where remanufacturing firms compete with OEMs who do
not remanufacture their postconsumer products. One of the relevant examples is
the competition between OEM inkjet printer manufacturers and third party printer
cartridge refillers. OEM inkjet printer manufacturers generally sell inkjet printers
at very low prices, sometimes even below the actual production cost. Selling new
inkjet cartridge at high prices is the major source of profit. The existence of a third-
party remanufacturer who supplies cheaper alternative products could disrupt the
OEM’s business model. The duopoly model we develop in this section considers this
type of competition between two firms when consumers are risk averse in purchasing
remanufactured products.
4.3.1 The model
We consider a duopoly where an OEM sells new products and a competitor sells
remanufactured products made from used products acquired from the OEM’s market.
The OEM determines the price pn of the new product. The competitor determines the
buyback price b and the price pr of the remanufactured product. The duopoly model
is built upon the same formulae (4.5) and (4.6), but there are now two decentralized
decision makers. We model this problem as a Stackelberg game where the OEM
moves first to set new product price pn and the competitor follows in setting the
buyback price b and the remanufactured product price pr.
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The OEM solves the following problem:






s.t. pn < θmax (4.15b)
The competitor solves the following problem:


















φmin ≤ b ≤ min{pr − cr, wS(ζ ￿￿)ps} (4.16c)
pr < vC(ξ
￿)pn + (1− vC(ξ￿))δb (4.16d)
The optimal solution to the Stackelberg game is generally solved by backward-
induction. First, the competitor’s best response (pr, b) to a given pn is computed. This
is equivalent to expressing pr and b as functions of pn. Next, the leader maximizes Πn
using the information pr(pn) and b(pn). Then, leader’s decisions are replaced in the
competitor’s best response functions to find an equilibrium solution. An analytical so-
lution is intractable due to the general distribution functions fθ(·) and fφ(·). Instead,
we take a numerical solution approach as described in the following subsection.
4.3.2 Numerical experiments
In this subsection we conduct numerical experiments using the same data and
WTP/WTA distributions shown in Table 4.3 and 4.4. The numerical computation of




, and b∗ follows the following iterative steps:
1. Choose a value for pn from a predefined discretized range,





































































Figure 4.10: The influence of consumers’ risk aversion in buying remanufactured
product. (‘m’: monopoly, ‘d’: duopoly)
maximize the profit Πr, and
3. compute the OEM’s profit Πn taking into account the competitor’s best re-
sponses pr(pn) and b(pn).
We repeat the above steps for all values of pn and choose the one that maximizes
Πn. This also determines the equilibrium solution for the retailer, which was already
computed during the iterations. A similar approach is used by Pedroso (1996). We use
the variable neighborhood search method to maximize Πr and Πn in each iteration.
141
4.3.2.1 The influence of consumers’ risk aversion on buying a remanufac-
tured product
In the duopoly market, the consumers’ risk aversion to the competitor’s remanu-
factured products is an opportunity to the OEM. As consumers become increasingly
risk averse in their purchase of the competitor’s remanufactured product, the OEM
cannibalizes the demand for the competitor’s product (“DN d” and “DR d” in Fig-
ure 4.10(b)), increases price pn (“pn d” in Figure 4.10(c)), and achieves a higher
profit (Figure 4.10(a)). The opposite happens to the competitor, i.e., it loses demand
(“DR d” in Figure 4.10(b)) even with decreasing price pr (“pr d” in Figure 4.10(c))
and profit decrease (Figure 4.10(a)). Less collection effort b will be required as there
will be less demand for remanufactured product. This applies to both monopoly and
duopoly situations (Figure 4.10(d)). In the monopoly, the OEM considers a tradeoff
between new and remanufactured products when it determines the optimal buyback
price. In the duopoly, the competitor’s objective is to maximize its profit by selling a
single category of product. The numerical results indicate that higher buyback price
is optimal in the duopoly case. We note that the above results are obtained from
numerical experiments. Thus, the validity of the results reported here applies to the
specific set of numerical data used for the numerical analysis.
4.3.2.2 The influence of consumers’ risk aversion in accepting buyback
price
When consumers are increasingly risk averse to accepting a given buyback price
to return their used products, the competitor’s profit performance decreases but not
as much as in the case where consumers’ risk aversion to remanufactured product
increases (Compare Figure 4.10(a) and Figure 4.11(a)). The risk aversion in the
collection channel affects demands for remanufactured product, and the OEM takes
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Figure 4.11: The influence of the consumers’ risk aversion in accepting buyback price.
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Figure 4.12: The influence of consumers’ weight factor for future resale value. (‘m’:
monopoly, ‘d’: duopoly)
It is interesting to observe that pn decreases in a monopoly but it increases in a
duopoly with an increase in consumers’ risk aversion to either purchasing remanufac-
tured product (Figure 4.10(c)) or returning their used products (Figure 4.11(c)). In
fact, this is consistent with the fact that firms can generally adopt higher prices when
they monopolize the market. In other words, as consumers become more risk averse
about the competitor’s product, the competitor becomes weaker in the competition
with the OEM. As a result, the OME’s power to monopolize the market increases
and it can implement a higher optimal price pn.
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4.3.2.3 The influence of consumers’ weight factor for future resale value
The parameter δ can be interpreted as an attribute of the product, the market,
or the entire system rather than of consumers. For example, almost all consumers
trade in their used vehicle when they purchase a new vehicle. In this case, the resale
value or trade-in value is one of the important factors for a purchase decision and
the value of δ will be large. Unlike in the monopoly case where the OEM performs
better by utilizing the opportunity from an increasing “willingness to return,” δ, of
used products from consumers, the two competitive firms in a duopoly do not enjoy
the same benefit. In a monopoly, the OEM allows demand cannibalization of new
product when consumers are highly willing to return their used products because
it can increase the total profit. In a duopoly, the OEM protects its market as any
demand cannibalization by the competitor may result in a profit loss. Figure 4.12(b)
shows that the demand for new product maintains at almost the same level regardless
of the value of δ. Consequently, the increase in demand for remanufactured product
is less than that of monopoly case. The result implies that in a duopoly situation,
consumers’ active participation in product remanufacturing may have limited effect.
4.3.2.4 Various distributions for WTP
Finally, we compare characteristics of the competition in different markets. Figure
4.13(a) shows that the OEM’s profit is significantly reduced by allowing the competi-
tor to remanufacture used products. As the Stackelberg leader, the OEM performs
generally better than the competitor. However, if the market condition is favorable
for the competitor, i.e., a larger low valuation cluster as in the bimodal (0.7) case,
than the competitor achieves a higher profit. The OEM gains higher demand for the
new product in a duopoly. This might be desirable for those who are concerned with
product cannibalization and market share. However, the expansion in the demand
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(f) Buyback prices
Figure 4.13: Various distributions for consumers’ WTP for remanufacturing product.
(Figure 4.13(d)). The competitor gains higher market share than the OEM in all
four different markets (Compare Figure 4.13(b) and Figure 4.13(c)). For example,
in the market where consumers’ WTP is normally distributed, the OEM and the
competitor’s market shares are about 44% and 55%, respectively. We note that the
total demand is significantly larger in duopoly than in monopoly. This is again due
to lower prices, especially, the price pr for the remanufactured product. In all, con-
sumers benefit most from the duopoly market. They can enjoy cheaper prices in a
‘greener’ market where more products are collected and remanufactured.
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4.4 Conclusions
In this research we investigated the influence of risk averse consumers’ decisions
on a firm’s profit performance and product cannibalization. The contribution of this
research is that we provide formal models that quantify the interactions among con-
sumers’ WTP distribution, quality uncertainty in postconsumer and remanufactured
products, consumers’ risk aversion, firm’s risk aversion, product cannibalization, and
the firm’s performance.
Optimal decision-making in CLSCs, especially pricing decisions, cannot be inde-
pendently solved without considering marketing activities. To this end, our approach
integrates principles from Operations Research and Marketing to obtain useful in-
sights on this previously rarely explored problem in the CLSC research area. We
conducted extensive numerical experiments for monopoly and duopoly cases to ob-
tain useful insights on the benefit of product remanufacturing. The key results are
summarized in Table 4.5 and Table 4.6. In general, OEMs perform worse when con-
sumers are more risk averse in a monopoly market. But when consumers are highly
willing to participate in product returns (e.g., δ = 0.9), OEMs can perform better
even when consumers become more risk averse. This is because the increase in buy-
back price strengthens consumers’ interest in purchasing remanufactured products,
which results in the creation of new demands.
Competition between an OEM and a remanufacturing firm induces higher de-
mands both for new and remanufactured products with lower prices for new and
remanufactured products. The OEM creates more demands for new products but
loses the entire demand for the remanufactured products to the competitor. The nu-
merical results show that the OEM’s profit is significantly reduced by the competition
with the remanufacturer. Demand for remanufactured products is cannibalized by
demand for new products as consumers are increasingly risk averse about purchasing
the remanufactured product. The competitor generally gains more demand than the
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Table 4.5: Influence of consumers’ risk aversion and ‘willingness-to-return’ (δ) in the
monopoly case. (Dt = Dn +Dr, ∆Π = profit gain from remanufacturing)
pn pr b Dn Dr Dt ∆Π
Risk aversion in forward channel ↑ - ↓ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↓
Risk aversion in reverse channel (δ = 0.1) ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↓
Risk aversion in reverse channel (δ = 0.9) ↑ - ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑
Willingness to return (δ) ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑
Table 4.6: Influence of consumers’ risk aversion and ‘willingness-to-return’ (δ) in the
duopoly case.
pn pr b Dn Dr Πn Πr
Risk aversion in forward channel ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓
Risk aversion in reverse channel ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓
Willingness to return (δ) ↑ - - ↑ - ↑ - -
OEM, but with a lower profit due to its follower position in the Stackelberg game. If
there exists a large low valuation cluster in the market, then the competitor achieves
a higher profit than the OEM in the competition.
It is commonly accepted without any thorough scientific justification that prod-
uct cannibalization should be avoided. One of the purposes of this research is to
challenge this common belief and to show that product cannibalization, which carries
negative allusions, may not be the right terminology to describe the situation where
the demand for remanufactured products replaces some demands for new products.
We argue that remanufactured products should be considered as one of product cat-
egories which makes up the entire product portfolio. From the perspective of revenue
management, it is desirable to diversify the product portfolio by offering several differ-
ent types of products to consumers as this will reach broader market segments, create
new demands, and increase profit. However, researchers and practitioners have been
focusing on minimizing or avoiding product cannibalization of new products when it
comes to ‘revenue management’ in CLSCs. Our results show that remanufacturing
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can increase a firm’s profit, but product cannibalization of new product by remanufac-
tured product is also likely. We verify this result for several different distributions of
consumers’ WTP, i.e., different markets, such as normal distributions, two-Gaussian
mixtures, and uniform distributions.
We identified two important issues with a solution (i.e., a set of prices) obtained
with a uniform assumption for a WTP distribution. First, it may not be possible to
implement the solution obtained from a uniform WTP assumption in a real market
due to the feasibility issues. Second, companies may suffer from the low profit perfor-
mance of the approximate solution based on a uniform WTP distribution assumption
in a real market. We demonstrated that optimal prices can vary significantly depend-
ing on the distribution of consumers’ WTP. But a uniform assumption for a real WTP
distribution tends to oversimplify a given market characteristics, which gives an infea-
sible or low-quality solution. Implementing the right prices is important, especially in
today’s market where consumers are highly price sensitive given the increase in price
transparency. Our results show that the knowledge of consumers’ WTP distribution
is critical for profitable and viable product remanufacturing.
Numerical results are used to demonstrate the application of the new models
developed here and to illustrate the kinds of insights that can be shown for specific
cases. However, these insights are limited to the particular numerical example studied.
For example, we used hypothetical distributions such as normal distributions and
gaussian mixtures to model consumers’ WTP and WTA. The optimal prices, profit,




Contributions and Future Research Directions
5.1 Contributions
This dissertation seeks to advance knowledge and understanding of decision-
making in closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs) through new quantitative models.
In Chapter II, we studied joint control of stochastic forward and stochastic reverse
material flows. CLSCs involve forward production activities and reverse production
activities, but most manufactures separate the operations of the two production sys-
tems. With an application to a CLSC where postconsumer products are collected
for warranty service purposes, we demonstrated that the benefit of coordinating two
production activities could be significant. We developed a model that can be used
to obtain an effective inventory control policy for coordinating forward and reverse
material flows. Through Monte Carlo simulation and global sensitivity analysis, we
identified major influential factors that affect system’s warranty cost savings perfor-
mance. The results indicate that joint control of forward and reverse material flows
greatly improves system’s robustness to uncertainties as well as warranty cost savings
performance.
In Chapter III, we developed a differential game model for characterizing de-
centralized time-varying competitive decision-making in a CLSC. This is a new ap-
proach in the field of CLSC research. Understanding temporal aspects of decen-
tralized decision-making in a CLSC is important for properly adapting the system
to today’s rapidly changing market environment. Unlike traditional forward supply
chains, CLSCs involve many stakeholders who pursue different objectives in forward
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and reverse production activities. As such, the differential game modeling framework
is particularly useful for studying time-varying competitive interactions among de-
centralized decision makers in CLSCs. We identified optimal prices and production
strategies that evolve over time under nonstationary market demand. Also, the model
provides quantitative scheme that can be used to obtain an efficient apportionment
of product recovery process.
In Chapter IV, we developed models that jointly determine optimal prices in
forward and reverse channels considering consumers’ WTP for remanufactured prod-
ucts, consumers’ WTA for a buyback price, consumers’ risk aversion to uncertainty.
Whereas price is one of the most effective variables for managing market demand,
previous CLSC research has mainly focused on operational problems without pay-
ing much attention on the interface between CLSC and market. The imbalance in
knowledge has resulted in the fear of product cannibalization. This research attempts
to restore a balance in the knowledge of CLSC by addressing important marketing
elements in pricing decisions. We obtained new insights on product cannibalization
based on quantitative models. The results suggest that the issue of product canni-
balization is better addressed by a well-informed model that consolidates operational
decisions with information on consumer characteristics. The proposed models re-
veal detailed interactions among consumers’ WTP/WTA, uncertainty in return flows,
product cannibalization, and firm’s profit.
In summary, this dissertation provides new insights on optimal decision making
in CLSCs where forward and reverse production activities are jointly coordinated.
5.2 Future Research Directions
The stochastic models discussed in Chapter II assume stationary demand, whereas
the dynamic game model in Chapter III assumes deterministic demand. Although
these models provide useful insights, neither case truly represents real situations.
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One of ways to improve the model’s limitation is to integrate both models within a
stochastic differential game. In this way, we can address the issues in Chapter II and
Chapter III without needing to assume stationary deterministic demand. This mod-
eling approach will enable knowledge and insights that better explain real situations
where various internal and external uncertainties and dynamic interactions among
decision-makers exist.
The dynamic game model in Chapter III can be extended in several ways. First,
in the discussion we have identified a specific range for the values of φR and φM in
which the manufacturer is able to lower the optimal wholesale price while engaging
in reverse production activities. The reason why we provided only the range on
φR is that a closed form solution for φ∗R is intractable for a general form of g(φM).
Nevertheless, we expect that, with some modification to the present approach or to





optimize the performance of the system for a given characteristic curve g(φM) and
system parameters. Second, uncertainty in the return flows is of special interest since
it significantly complicates the operation of reverse and forward productions in many
practical situations. In particular, if the realization of market demands is significantly
different from what was expected initially, then the retailer may defect from its initial
decision. The manufacturer and retailer should be able to protect themselves from
such uncertainties, but the best structure under which to analyze the system behavior
is not immediately apparent.
In the duopoly model in Chapter IV, we assumed that the OEM only sells new
product but does not collect used products. In practical cases, the OEM may collect
its used products in order to prevent other remanufacturing firms from collecting
and remanufacturing its used products, which could cannibalize the demand for new
product. In this case, the OEM can try to cannibalize the return flows in the reverse
channel, while remanufacturing firms try to cannibalize the demand in the forward
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channel. This problem can be addressed with a slight modification to our current
model by implementing a competition mechanism in the reverse channel and assigning
one more decision variable, i.e., another buyback price, to the OEM.
Our results indicates that the OEM’s profit performance is significantly degraded
when it is challenged by competition from a remanufacturing firm. The best case for
the OEM happens when it monopolizes the market with its new and remanufactured
products. There may exist substantial levels of product cannibalization, yet our
results demonstrate that this is much better than competing with a remanufacturing
firm. This provides insights to OEM inkjet printer manufacturers. We have not heard
of any case where an OEM sells remanufactured inkjet printer cartridges. But there
are many inkjet cartridge refillers who compete with OEMs. One way to improve the
situation would be to employ a suitable coordination scheme that aligns the objectives
of the competing firms. This extension could provide useful insights on setting up
the entire system in such a way that all stakeholders including firms and consumers
are better off while making the system more sustainable and financially viable.
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